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ABSTRACT
This Thesis aims to compare and contrast the doctrines of God found 
within the writings of Paul Tillich, Alfred North Whitehead and 
Charles Hartshorne.
Chapter one is concerned with an exposition of Tillich's concept of 
God while chapter two examines the process view and explains the
divergence of Hartshorne from Whitehead.
In chapter three I discuss general similarities of system structure 
and basic ideology between Tillich and Process but conclude that there 
are insurmountable difficulties in bringing the two systems into
closer dialogue. The religious and philosophical similarities and
differences are outlined and the judgement made that ultimately the 
difference is due to Tillich's insistence on symbolic language. I 
also argue in chapter three that while Tillich and Process cannot be 
brought together as systems they can benefit from one another at 
specific points. for example Tillichs' insight into the 
phenomenological threat of non-being can be included in process to 
enrich its ability to address the human situation.
In chapter four I analyse both Whiteheads' concept of Prehension and 
Tillichs' concept of participation and show how the latter can be 
clarified by reference to the former. I believe that Tillich uses 
participation to apply to different levels of relatedness from the
mere 'having of relation' to the saving participation of the New 
Being. I conclude that if Prehension is used to interpret the basic 
levels of relationship then participation is free to be used for 
higher meanings only. 4
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is the result of a year's full time research carried out 
in St. Mary's college between 1981 and 1982. My initial interest was 
in the theology of Paul Tillich, and it was while making exploratory 
investigations into his doctrine of God that I became fascinated by 
the apparent affinity between Tillich and process. There were 
obviously a number of avenues I could have taken, following 
tantalising suggestions such as Claude Stewart's, that process 
philosophy embodies the protestant principle, or Robert Scharlemann's, 
that being itself could be reinterpreted to bring Tillich more into
line with process. I preferred, however, to make a general
comparison, initially, to see how deep the affinities really went.
From this initial study I became convinced that while the two systems
were extremely close in their intentions and basic structure the 
affinities could not be exploited to bring about any kind of unity. I 
realised that there was a fundamental gulf between the systems caused 
by Tillich's insistence on symbolic language.
I became aware, at the same time however, that the strengths of the 
two modes of thought lay in different directions. Process is one of 
the most comprehensive and rationalistic metaphysics ever developed, 
and yet it speaks little to man's spiritual experience; Tillich's 
brilliance, on the other hand, lies in his phenomenological insights 
into the conditions of human existence. This was where process and 
Tillich could benefit most from each other; by using the meaningful 
but murky insights of the latter to add richness and depth to the 
carefully defined and elucidated concepts of the former.
Is
The thesis contains four chapters. In the first two I explain the 
different concepts of God. Chapter three deals with a general |
Î
comparison, investigates the reasons for the irrevocable difference 1
between the systems as systems, and attempts to illustrate some useful 
points of dialogue. Chapter four includes an analysis of the concepts 
of prehension and participation and suggests ways in which the one can 
clarify the other.
_
CHAPTER ONE
Tillich's Concept of God
It is important at the outset to understand Tillich's basic viewpoint. 
He is not constructing a philosophical system but a theological one, 
and he sees theology as a function of the church which must serve the 
needs of the church. He is writing from within the 'theological 
circle’, that is, he accepts and affirms the universal validity of the 
Christian message; he has made an existential decision of faith and 
works always from this standpoint. While he admits that no-one can 
put himself in a situation of faith, through his own personal
decision, he stresses that to be a theologian one must have the
Christian message as one's ultimate concern.
The aim of theology is twofold, says Tillich, it is;-
"The statement of the truth of the Christian message and the
c-interpretation of this truth for every new generation". (1)
This explains why theology is an ongoing process, because the
contemporary situation is always changing. Tillich sees the 
contemporary situation, to which each generations theology must speak, 
not as being the psychological or sociological state of the times but
as being the interpretations of history given by non-theological
disciplines. Theology must be able to relate its message to the
understanding of human life given by the scientific, philosophical,
economic, political and artistic disciplines. Tillich criticises 
Fundamentalism, Liberalism and Barth's Neo-orthodoxy for failing to
(1) Tillich, P. Systematic Theology I; p3 (hereafter referred to as 
S.T.)
achieve this two fold aim. Fundamentalism, he claims, fails to 
achieve either aim. It fails to state the eternal truth because it 
identifies that truth with one of its past temporary expressions i.e. 
the Bible and because of this it cannot speak to the present time. It 
puts itself in conflict with the present situation by struggling 
against the insights of modern science and philosophy.
Tillich claims that Liberalism obliterates the eternal truth of 
Christianity by reducing it to certain aspects of the contemporary 
situation. For example Dewey reduced the meaning of God to certain 
ideals which we posit and certain natural processes that work towards 
the realisation of those ideals.
Tillich agrees with Barth's insistence that the revelation of God
cannot be identified with any temporary expression of revelation. 
Both men would agree that revelation is experiential not 
prepositional. The words of the Bible record the events of revelation 
but are not identical with it. They are human and finite and 
therefore open to error. Tillich's disagreement with Barth is that
his kerygmatic theology fails to relate the eternal truth to the
contemporary situation because Barth will not acknowledge any point of 
contact between theology and philosophy, between Christian message and 
situation. For Barth you distort the message if you try to make it 
reasonable, it is an affront to human reason, 'You throw the gospel 
like a stone'.
Tillich fulfils his twofold aim and brings the Christian message in 
contact with the present situation through his basic method, the 
method of correlation, which;
"explains the contents of the Christian faith through 
existential questions and theological answers in mutual 
interdépendance". (1)
Tillich aims to analyse the human situation to discover the 
existential questions of existence and then show how the Christian 
symbols are the answers to these questions.
Tillich sees three levels of correlation in a general sense which are 
all echoed in a theological sense. These three levels are a) 
scientific facts, data, and statistics; b) the relation of one 
concept to another; c) the interdependence of objects and events in 
reality. In theology these levels are seen in, firstly symbolic 
religious language, secondly concepts pertaining to the human and the 
divine and thirdly in the factual sense between man's ultimate concern 
and that about which he is ultimately concerned.
This third level or meaning of correlation is the important one 
because it qualifies the divine-human relationship. God in his 
essence or in his "abysmal nature" is totally independant of man, but 
God in his self manifestation to man is dependant on the way man 
receives his manifestation. The divine-human relationship changes 
with the stages of the history of revelation.
"There is a mutual interdependence between 'God for us' and 
'we for God'.... The 'divine-human encounter' means 
something real for both sides". (2)
Of ultimate importance for Tillich, however, is the correlation
(1) ibid. p68
(2) ibid. p68
between questions and answers or specifically between the basic 
questions of being human i.e. questions about ones own being or 
existence and the answers of revelation. By utilising this 
correlation Tillich hopes to preserve the balance between 
fundamentalism and apologetic theology. His main concern is with the 
latter but he does not want to lose the kerygmatic nature of the 
message, hence his twofold theological aim.
By using the method of correlation theology makes an analysis of the 
human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it 
demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the 
answers to these questions. This is where the theologian must become 
a philosopher, for:
"The analysis of existence, including the development of the 
questions implict in existence is a philosophical task". (1)
Here we must look at how Tillich defines philosophy and the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. In the absence of a 
generally accepted definition of philosophy Tillich defines it as; 
"...that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as
such is the object. Reality as such, or reality as a whole,
is not the whole of reality; it is the structure which makes
reality a whole and therefore a potential object of 
knowledge". (2)
Philosophy and theology ask the same question, both ask the question
(1) ibid. p71
(2) ibid. p22
of reality as a whole and both share an identical ultimate. In the 
case of philosophy this ultimate is Being-itself and in the case of 
theology it is, of course, God. Tillich expresses the similarity 
thus :
"There is a point of identity between the ultimate of the
philosophical question and the ultimate of the religious 
concern. In both cases ultimate reality is sought and 
expressed conceptually in philosophy, symbolically in
religion. Philosophical truth consists in true concepts
concerning the ultimate; the truth of faith consists in true 
symbols concerning the ultimate". (1)
Theology must be concerned with that which concerns us ultimately and 
this must belong to reality as a whole, otherwise we could not 
encounter it or be concerned by it. It must also be the ground of our
being or "being-itself" and not merely one being among others,
otherwise it could not exercise infinite concern. This ’being itself
manifests itself through the structure of being and hence is the
proper subject matter of philosophy; or at least of philosophy as 
Tillich sees it, which is better described as ontology. The 
ontological question asks: 'What is being itself?’ and it implies an
asking subject and an object about which the question is asked. In 
other words it presupposes the subject-object or self-world structure 
of everything that is. The basic structure of reality is dialectical, 
it is polar in character and the elements which compose this basic 
structure share its polarity.
(1) Tillich, P. Dynamics of Faith. p90 (hereafter referred to as 
D.F.)
"Three outstanding pairs of elements constitute the basic 
ontological structure; individuality and universality,
dynamics and form, freedom and destiny. In these three
polarities the first element expresses the self relatedness 
of being... while the second element expresses the
belongingness of being, its character of being a part of a 
universe of being". (1)
The basic polarity in this subject-object structure of reason, 
however, is the self-world polarity. Being a self means being 
separated in some way from everything else and at the same time being 
aware that you are a part of everything else. Every 'self’ has an - 
environment with which it has an active interrelation, but man has a 
world. Man, the completely centred self, the ego-self, has a world 
which is a structured whole, which includes and transcends all 
particular environments.
"Even in the most limited environment man possesses the 
universe; he has a world. Language, as the power of 
universels, is the basic expression of man’s transcending 
his environment, of having a world". (2)
The parity of individualisation and participation follows on from 
this; every self is an individual and yet every individual self I
participates in its environment or its world. The two poles form a 
balanced whole because the more a self is individualised the more it 
can participate and it is through this participation that it becomes 
individualised. The level of complete individualisation is, at the 
same time, the level of complete participation.
(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I; pl83
(2) ibid. pl89
"When individualisation reaches the perfect form which we
call ’person', participation reaches the perfect form which 
we call ’communion'... Communion is participation in 
another completely centred and completely individual self".(l)
The one side of the polarity is impossible without the other, if one
is destroyed then the other is likewise.
The form and content of a being are identical, the form of a thing is
what makes it what it is. The polar opposite of form is dynamics or 
the potentiality of being. Tillich also refers to this as the 
polarity of vitality and intentional!ty. Man's creative vitality is 
bound by intentionality, it is directed and formed and always 
transcends itself towards meaningful contents. Vitality and 
intentionality are interdependent and could not exist in isolation. 
"The dynamic character of being implies the tendency of 
everything to transcend itself and to create new forms. At 
the same time everything tends to conserve its own form as 
the basis of its self-transcendence". (2)
The third and possibly most fundamental polarity is that of freedom 
and destiny. It is this polarity which makes existence possible when 
linked with finitude. Finite freedom is the turning point from being 
to existence. Freedom should not be regarded as the freedom of any 
particular function, such as ’will’ but rather as the freedom of the 
whole person; indicating that every part and function of the self 
participates in its freedom. Freedom is experienced by man because
(1) ibid. pl95
(2) ibid. pl99
only man is completely self centred. Destiny is not some kind of 
strange power controlling what will happen, it is not the opposite of 
freedom but rather its limits and conditions. 'Fate' is the simple 
contradiction of freedom and this could not be used in polar 
correlation. Destiny is that out of which our decisions arise
"... it is the indefinitely broad basis of our centred 
selfhood, it is the concreteness of our being which makes 
all our decisions our decisions... [Destiny] is myself as 
given, formed by nature, history and myself. My destiny is 
the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping 
my destiny". (1)
The concept of finitude is central to this question of being because 
it is the finitude of being which drives us towards God. The basic 
ontological structure and its constituent elements imply finitude; to 
be something is not to be something else; to be here and now is not to 
be there and then; to is to be finite. Essential finitude is a 
necessary part of existence and leads to ontological anxiety. Anxiety 
in this sense must not be confused with dread or fear which are 
psychological, not ontological, phenomena. Anxiety is always present, 
although often latent; it is the self awareness of the finite self as 
finite. Disruption and despair, on the other hand, are not essential 
but existential. Finitude puts the ontological polarities into 
tension, it produces the possibility of a loss of one of the poles. 
Man realises this threat and oscillates from one pole to the other 
aware that the loss of one pole would lead to the destruction of the 
ontological structure. This is not the same as the simple, direct,
(1) ibid. p204
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fear of non-being but is rather the fear of disruption, and self 
destruction. It is an existential possibility rather than an 
essential necessity.
"The anxiety of finitude is not the despair of self
destruction. Christianity sees in the picture of Jesus as
the Christ a human life in which all forms of anxiety are 
present but from which all forms of despair are absent". (1)
The explanation of the structure of being is obviously fundamental to 
Tillich's system but he sees it as primarily a philosophical rather 
than theological area; although he has been criticised for blurring 
the distinctions between the two subjects. Heywood Thomas, for 
example, accuses Tillich of committing a tautology; he claims that 
Tillich defines theology and philosophy in the same way and then 
deduces that every theologian must be concerned with the basic 
questions of philosophy. This, I think, is too harsh, for Tillich
goes on to point out the divergent and convergent trends in the 
relationship between theology and philosophy and while his convergent 
trends are, to say the least, dubious his divergent trends are more 
understandable and acceptable. Thus he claims that the two 
disciplines ask the question of being from different perspectives. 
The philosopher must be detached and objective, his passion, says 
Tillich is;
"...the passion for a truth which is open to general 
approach, subject to general critisism... open and 
communicable". (2)
(1) ibid. p224
(2) ibid. p26
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The theologian on the other hand must work within the theological 
circle, he has a concrete commitment to the content he expounds, he is 
"existential" in that he is involved with the whole of his existence 
and is determined by his faith. The philosopher and theologian also 
differ in their sources. The philosopher assumes that there is an 
identity between the logos of reality as a whole and the individual 
logos working in him. The theologian, however, is not concerned with 
the universal logos but with the Logos "who became flesh", with the 
particular manifestation of logos in history.
Tillich’s description of the point of convergence between philosophy 
and theology is that every philospher exists in the power of an 
ultimate concern. Every philosopher is a hidden theologian. What he 
seems to be saying is that the philosopher must be detached but he 
cannot be, he attempts to serve the universal logos but he cannot 
escape his existential situation, and he is a theologian to the extent
that he cannot escape this situation. The theologian, on the other
hand, turns towards his existential situation but can only function by 
being detached from it.
"The detachment required in honest theological work can 
destroy the necessary involvement of faith. This tension is 
the burden and the greatness of every theological work". (1) 
Heywood-Thomas criticises this, commenting that:
"... it is like saying that a dog is an animal with four
legs, a furry coat, and a tail, and that insofar as a cat
has these characteristics it is a dog". (2)
(1) ibid. p30
(2) Thomas, J.H. Paul Tillich : An Appraisal. p43
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Heywood-Thomas has a good point. There is a basic fallacy in
Tillich’s understanding of philosophy in that he refuses to see that
it is distinguished from other arts and sciences by its methods rather 
than by its subject matter. The subject of philosophy is all reality,
it cannot really be limited in the way Tillich tries to.
Tillich does maintain a final distinction between philosophy and 
theology. He claims that there can be no conflict or synthesis 
between the two disciplines because either of these would require a 
common basis which does not exist. Conflicts or alliances between 
philosophers and theologians may take place on either a philosophical 
or theological level but the two levels cannot conflict themselves.
As we have seen theology must be about that which concerns us 
ultimately. Tillich maintains two formal criteria to support this. 
Firstly, only those propositions which deal with their object in so 
far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us are 
theological. Secondly, only those statements which deal with their 
object insofar as it can become a matter of being or non-being for us 
are theological. For only that which has the power of threatening or 
saving our being, threatening or saving the structure, the meaning, 
and the aim, of existence is of ultimate concern to us. The first of 
these criteria helps to distinguish between ultimate and preliminary 
concerns and thus between theological and scientific, historical or 
political questions which concern our relation to the world of 
existence. The second criterion does not point to any specific 
content or doctlîne but remains open. At the same time though it 
excludes contents which do not have the power to express that which 
determines being and non-being.
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For Tillich there is only one way to 'do’ theology and that is 
systematically.
"It has always been impossible for me to think theologically
in any other than a systematic way. The smallest problem if
taken seriously and radically, drove me to all other 
problems and to the anticipation of a whole in which they 
could find their solution". (1)
There are three basic parts to his system’s structure. These are the 
sources, the medium and the norm. Tillich claims that the bible is
not the only source, it could not have been understood and received
apart from the preparation for it in the previous generations, so the 
systematic theologian must draw from Church history among many others. 
In fact the sources are almost unlimited but they are not all of equal 
relevance or importance. Their degree of importance is measured by 
the directness or indirectness of their relationship to the appearance 
of Christ.
The sources are not merely presented as informative. They are 
received by us through the medium of experience, which does not leave 
them untouched although it does not disrupt their message. Tillich 
makes experience a medium, and not a source, of systematic theology 
because he realises the dangers of asserting a religious experience 
which transcends the Christian message as bound to the unique event of 
Christ. Here Tillich joins neo-othodoxy in its rejection of 
Schliermacher’s attempt to derive all the contents of the Christian 
faith from the "religious consciousness" but he believes that the neo­
orthodox went too far in totally rejecting experience. As Heywood-
(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p.ix (preface)
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Thomas puts it;
"Christian theology ’is based on the unique event of Jesus
the Christ’ and this event is given to experience but is not
derived from it". (1)
With such a variety of sources and such an indefinite medium some kind 
of a norm is necessary. The question of a norm is an old one and 
their development has been an historical process. The norm must never 
become, however, merely the private opinion of a theologian but must
be the expression of an encounter of the Church with the Christian
message. In man’s present situation of despair and self estrangement 
Tillich sees the norm as the "New-Being" in Jesus as the Christ.
These three basic parts are all brought together by Tillich in the 
following way;
"The Christian message provides the answers to the questions 
implied in human existence. These answers are contained in 
the revelatory events on which Christianity is based and are 
taken by systematic theology from the sources, through the 
medium, under the norm". (2)
This systematic approach has been criticised by some as leading to a 
conflict between the content and form of the system. The form, it is 
claimed, becomes self sufficient and determines the content. David 
Roberts criticises Tillich for this, but while Tillich is happy to 
admit that it is an everpresent danger he refuses to accept that his 
system suffers in any serious way. Tillich claims, rightly, that he 
controls this possibility of conflict between content and form by
(1) Thomas, J.H. op.cit. p25
(2) Tillich, P. S.T. I p72
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beginning each part of his system with an existential analysis of the 
questions implied in human existence to which the theological concepts 
are supposed to speak. Perhaps a lesser mind may fall into the trap 
of adjusting his material to fit the systems but I think whatever 
other faults he may have this is not one of Tillich’s.
A far more telling criticism of Tillich, levelled by Emmett,
Hartshorne and others, is that he lacks precision and consistency in 
his terminology. He explains this by pointing out that much of his 
work has been produced in an ad hoc fashion by way of speeches and 
essays. This, however, he realises is no answer and he goes on to 
draw a distinction between kinds of consistency and precision. What 
he calls the ’definitional’ and the ’configurational’.
"There are notions which resist definition and whose meaning 
can only be shown by configuration with other notions. The 
basic ontological concepts fall into this category. The 
philosophical task with respect to them is not to define 
them but to illuminate them by showing how they appear in
different constellations. This way of "showing" may be
precise or lacking in precision, consistent or inconsistent.
But the criterion is not the definitional precision and 
consistency". (1)
This is sidestepping the issue. Tillich is right when he explains why 
there may be a lack of precision and consistency in his work but he is 
wrong in implying that he does not suffer from the problem. 
Hartshorne, for instance, does not criticise Tillich on purely 
definitional grounds over the use of the term symbol and on any
(1) Kegley, C.W. and Bretall, R.W. (eds.) The Theology of Paul 
Tillich p330
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measure of precision Tillich's concept of participation would be found 
wanting.
Any explication of Tillich’s concept of God is necessarily complicated 
by his assertion that we can have no direct knowledge of God and can 
speak about him only in symbolic language. In fact Tillich does allow 
one non-symbolic statement about God, that is, that he is ’being-
itself’. Tillich is not consistent on this point, however, and 
occasionally claims that all statements about God are symbolic. This 
was his original position in 1940 which he later modified. In his
reply to interpretation and criticism in the Kegley and Bretall volume 
he acknowledged the criticism of Professor Urban which forced him;
"... to acknowledge that in order to speak of symbolic 
knowledge one must delimit the symbolic realm by an
unsymbolic statement... the unsymbolic statement which 
implies the necessity of religious symbolism is that God is 
being itself, and as such beyond the subject-object 
structure of everything that is". (1)
Despite occasional departures from this statement (2) it has become 
accepted as Tillich’s true position, and I will treat is as such.
The question we must now pose is, how helpful in understanding the 
concept of God is this equation of God with being-itself? Or what is 
being-itself? Rowe points out that although being-itself is used in 
an explanatory way with reference to the idea of God it is not a 
readily understandable concept. Indeed it too is ineffable and can
(1) ibid. p334
(2) See, for example, Rowe, W.L. Religious Symbols and God pp24-31 
(hereafter referred to as R.S.G.)
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only be spoken of symbolically.
We have seen how Tillich distinguishes between theology and philosophy 
and how the term 'God’ is a religious symbol while ’being-itself’ is a 
philosophical concept. We have also seen that the concepts in which 
philosophy expresses the ultimate are not totally non-symbolic and 
that the symbols of religion contain conceptual elements. Indeed, for 
Tillich, it is only because every religious symbol has conceptual 
potentialities that ’theology’ is possible. (Theology is here seen as 
the elucidation of religious statements about God in terms of 
ontological statements about Being-itself). Of course, the fact that 
philosophical concepts about the ultimate cannot be completely non- 
symbolic makes it impossible for any elucidating ontological 
statements to be wholly non-symbolic. Hence Rowe’s claim that the 
concept of being-itself is, in the end, as ineffable as the concept of 
God. This returns us to the problem of what use is it to speak of God 
in ontological terms? William Alston criticises Tillich at this 
point. He comments on Tillich’s claim that the theological statement 
ascribing ’will’ to God can be interpreted as a symbol for ’dynamics 
in all it’s ramifications’.
"If they were intended to be simply the replacement of one 
symbol by another symbol they would be grotesque failures.
No one would suppose that ’dynamics in all it’s 
ramifications’ is a better religious symbol i.e. performs a 
symbolic function better or more clearly than ’will'". (1)
Rowe defends Tillich, and I believe correctly, when he says that 
’dynamics in all its ramifications’ is obviously not a better 
religious symbol than ’will’ because it is not intended to be a
(1) Quoted from Rowe, W.L. R.S.G. pl85
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religious symbol. It is an ontological symbol or statement and its 
purpose is not to provoke religious feeling but to explain reality, to 
attempt to get a conceptual grasp of the reality lying behind the 
imagery of religious symbolism. Although we cannot say that ’dynamics 
in all its ramifications' is a non-symbolic statement it can be
claimed that it is, ontologically speaking, less symbolic than ’will’.
It is partly because Tillich equates God with the ultimate of
philosophical questioning that he can say that;
"'God' is the answer to the question implied in man's
finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man 
ultimately". (1)
This is how Tillich begins his phenomenological description of the
meaning of the term 'God'. He continues,
"... this does not mean that first there is a being called
God and then the demand that man should be ultimately
concerned about him. It means that whatever concerns man
ultimately becomes god for him". (2)
Tillich goes on to explain that the term "being ultimately concerned"
implies a tension within human experience. On one hand one cannot be
ultimately concerned about what one cannot encounter, about what is 
not concrete (for instance one cannot be ultimately concerned about
the abstract concept 'love' unless that concept be embodied in some
concrete reality i.e. family or friends). On the other hand ultimate 
concern cannot be directed towards something preliminary or finite, it 
must transcend the whole realm of finitude in order to be the answer
(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p234
(2) ibid. p234
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to the question implied in finitude (i.e. ultimate concern must be 
truly ultimate, therefore, abstract).
To quote:
"... this is the inescapable inner tension in the idea of 
God. The conflict between the concreteness and the ultimacy 
of the religious concern is actual whenever God is 
experienced... It is the key to understanding the dynamics 
of the history of religion, and it is the basic problem of 
every doctrine of God, from the earliest priestly wisdom to 
the most refined discussions of the trinitarian dogma." (1)
This inner tension which Tillich astutely notices in the phenomena of 
religion is important both for Tillich's system and, as we shall see 
later, for any comparison between Tillich and the process school. It 
is important within Tillich's system because it gives rise to his 
theory of religious language and knowledge i.e. his theory of symbols. 
This aspect of Tillich’s thought is pivotal to his whole system and is 
one of the most criticised aspects of his work. I will give here a 
brief summary of his theory as outlined predominantly in 'Dynamics of 
Faith' and his much published essay 'The Religious Symbol' (2) and
then look at some of the major criticisms.
(1) ibid. p234
(2) This article has a long publishing history, perhaps reflecting its importance for Tillich. It first appeared in Blotter fur 
deutsche Philosophie Vol.l, No.4. It has appeared several times in English; first in the Journal of Liberal Religion, II (Summer 
1940), pl3-33. It was published in Daedalus, LXXXVII (Summer1958), pp3”21; in Symbolism in Religion and Literature, ed. R.
May (New York : George Brazillier Inc. 1960); and inReligious Experience and Truth, ed. S.Hook (New York : N.Y.University Press, 1961). The references here are to itsappearance in Myth and Symbol, ed. F.E. Dillistone (London: 
S.P.O.K. Theological Collections, 1966)
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In ’The Religious Symbol' Tillich outlines four general 
characteristics of all symbols.
(a) First and most basic is the figurative quality which implies that 
the inner attitude oriented towards the symbol is not aimed at the 
symbol itself but rather at what is symbolised.
(b) Perceptibility is also present in all symbols. This means that 
the symbols make perceptible, and gives objectivity to, something 
which is otherwise intrinsically invisible, ideal, or transcendent.
(c) All symbols have an innate power which distinguish them from mere 
signs which are impotent in themselves.
"This characteristic is decisive for the distinction between 
a sign and a symbol. The symbol.... cannot be exchanged.
It can only disappear when, through dissolution, it loses 
its inner power. Nor can it be merely constructed; it can 
only be created". (1)
(d) The last general characteristic is the symbols acceptability as 
such. A symbol must be socially rooted and supported.
"Hence it is not correct to say that a thing is first a
symbol and then gains acceptance; the process of it becoming
a symbol and the acceptance of it as a symbol belong
together". (2)
These four characteristics are shared alike by ordinary and religious 
symbols. The difference between them lies not in the characteristics 
but in the nature of the things symbolised. Ordinary symbols either 
stand for something that has an objective unsymbolic meaning of its
(1) Tillich, P. 'The Religious Symbol' pl6 (hereafter referred to as 
'R.S.')
(2) ibid. pl6
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own; for instance a flag may symbolise a king and a king a state; or 
they give expression to an invisible thing that has no existence other 
than in its symbols; for instance works of art, scientific concepts 
and legal forms. A religious symbol, on the other hand, expresses an 
object which is totally transcendent; which, by its very nature, is 
totally beyond the subject/object division.
"A real symbol points to an object which never can become an 
object. Religious symbols represent the transcendent but do 
not make the transendent immanent. They do not make God a 
part of the empirical world". (1)
In ’Dynamics of Faith’ Tillich stresses the difference between sign 
and symbol.
"Decisive is the fact that signs do not participate in the 
reality of that to which they point, while symbols do." (2)
This concept of participation is of vital importance in Tillich’s 
theory of symbols. It is the distinguishing feature between mere 
signs and symbols, it is the reason symbols can function as mediators 
of ultimate concern, and it is the reason why symbols cannot be 
governed by convention but must grow out of the collective 
unconscious. Tillich also introduces, in ’Dynamics of Faith', a two 
fold function of symbols. The first function is that symbols open up 
levels of reality which are otherwise closed to us. This is 
especially true of the arts which reveal elements which science could 
not. The second function is that symbols reveal dimensions and 
elements of our soul corresponding to the new aspects of reality which 
are revealed.
(1) ibid. pl7
(2) Tillich, P. D.F. p42
22
23
:*
:Ï
4"A great play gives us not only a new vision of the human i
scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our being... There 
are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware 
except through symbols". (1)
The theory of religious symbols must obviously be linked to the 
concept of faith, which Tillich describes as 'the state of being 
ultimately concerned'. For Tillich faith has no other language than 
symbols because ultimate concern can only be expressed symbolically 
and never directly or properly.
Why, for Tillich, must God be that which concerns man ultimately? For ;
Tillich, man is existentially estranged from his essential self. All '|
existent beings (God, of course, is not in this category) are a 
mixture of being and non-being; they are maintained out of non-being 
through participation in being-itself, which can therefore be 
described as the 'ground' or 'power' of being. Therefore creation 
cannot be seen as an isolated, once for all, event, it is a continuous 
creation, man is continually being supported against non-being. To be 
finite, concrete, contingent, in short, to exist is to participate in 
both being and non-being and is, therefore, to be under the threat of 
non-being. For Tillich this threat of non-being comes to man in the
form of an ontological shock and leaves him in a state of fear. In
"The Courage to Be" Tillich speaks of three forms of the fear on non- 
being, they are:
(a) ontic non-being - the fear of fate and death.
(b) Spiritual non-being - the fear of emptiness and meaninglessness.
(c) moral non-being - the fear of guilt and condemnation.
(1) ibid. p43 ?
The only thing that can overcome this ontological shock is faith, 
because the only answer to the conditions of finitude is God or Being- 
itself. God is the answer to the questions implied in man's finitude 4
and, therefore, must be of ultimate concern.
i
All this stems from Tillich's method of correlation. The chief 
exemplification of which is, of course, the fact that the basic i
question of man's situation, the question or threat of non-being, is i
answered by Christianity's most basic symbol, God. Having said this Iwe must account for Tillich's statement that 'whatever concerns man 5
ultimately becomes God for him'. This is a phenomenological statement 
and points to the insight that, in practice, man treats many things as :
his god; for example, the unswerving way some people pursue power or ;
money. Or to use one of Tillich's examples, the overwhelming 
nationalism shown by the Nazis in the 1930's. It can, of course, be 
said, using Tillich's thinking, that all these things, money, power, i
nation are potentially symbols for being itself, therefore, there is ;
nothing wrong in them being treated as such. This is, however, a 
misunderstanding. True, anything has the potential to mediate being- 
itself and hence to be a symbol but the thing becomes a bad symbol, or 
perhaps Tillich would say an idolatrous symbol, when it is seen as |
embodying the holy ("the quality of that which concerns man ^
■'■yultimately") in itself and not in a mediating way. Hence we can say
that money can be, and perhaps occasionally is, a symbol for being 51itself. But if it is seen as embodying the holy directly within |
itself, if it is seen as ultimate and not the mediator of ultimacy,
then it becomes an idolatrous symbol. It is important to realise that |■Iit does not cease to be a symbol or become a dead symbol; for the 
person who directs ultimate concern towards it, it is still a live 
symbol. This is why Tillich can speak of the risk of faith. The risk
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comes from the uncertainty that one must always feel regarding the
truth of one’s symbols. To quote:
"Ultimate concern is ultimate risk and ultimate courage. It 
is not risk and needs no courage with respect to ultimacy 
itself. But it is risk and demands courage if it affirms a 
concrete concern. And every faith has a concrete element in 
itself. It is concerned about something or somebody. (1)
The most basic of all religious symbols, the notion of God, contains 
two elements. Firstly the element of ultimacy which is a matter of 
direct experience and not symbolic; secondly the element of
concreteness which we symbolically apply to God. As Tillich writes: 
"... the word ’God' involves a double meaning: it connotes
the unconditioned transcendent, the ultimate, and also an 
object somehow endowed with qualities and actions. The 
first is not figurative or symbolic, but is rather in the 
strictest sense what it is said to be". (2)
The only way I can interpret this is that Tillich is allowing another 
non-symbolic statement about God other than 'God is being itself. 
Here he quite clearly wishes to call God "the unconditioned 
transcendent, the ultimate", in a literal, non-symbolic way.
It is this double meaning in the notion of God which allows Tillich to 
introduce his thoughts on the non-existence of God. He asserts that, 
"... it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it 
is to deny it". (3)
(1) ibid. pl8
(2) Tillich, P. 'R.S.' p28
(3) Tillich, P. S.T. I p237
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Tillich can say this because he defines 'existence' in relation to the 
realm of beings. To exist is to be a being, to be finite and 
contingent. Of course this cannot apply to God, God is being itself, 
the ground and power of all individual finite beings. God transcends 
both the realm of existence and the realm of essence.
The important question is why does Tillich deny existence of God? 
What does he gain by doing so? I think one of the principle reasons 
is his cavalier attitude to, and dislike of, logic. He does not wish 
to get involved in any of the logical attempts to prove or disprove 
the existence of God as this is an area in which he is clearly very 
uncomfortable. The second reason stems from his description of the 
human condition as being under the threat of non-being. To exist is 
to be held out of non-being through participation in being itself. 
The ultimate being itself cannot therefore be part of the realm of 
existence or it too would face the threat of non-being which would 
obviously be a nonsense.
In effect Tillich's denial of the existence of God is a convenient 
technical tool which frees him from what he himself calls the "grave 
difficulties" which attend the attempt to speak of God as existing. 
He accomplishes this denial of existence, as we have seen, by limiting 
the definition of the word existence, and many of the difficulties and 
confusions between Tillich and his critics on this point stem, I 
believe, from differing understandings of the term 'existence'. We 
can see now why Tillich is accused of; on the one hand, denying 
existence to God and, on the other, speaking as though God existed. 
It is, to my mind, impossible to speak of anything we regard as real 
and non-ficticious as having qualities (whether actually or 
symbolically) without speaking as though it were existent, in the
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broadest sense of the word 'exist*.
We have so far looked only at the most basic religious symbol, God.
Obviously some account must be taken of the plethora of lesser symbols
and how these are used in symbolic language. Tillich's own
explication of the various types of religious symbol distinguishes two 
separate levels.
"... a supporting level in which religious objectivity is 
established and which is based in itself; and a level 
supported by it and pointing to objects of the other level". (1)
The first level is the most important and Tillich calls these the
"objective religious symbols". The second level, which becomes
somewhat confused, he calls "self transcending religious symbols".
Tillich subdivides the objective symbols into four groups.
(a) First and most basic is the world of divine beings, principally 
the name God. These are representations of the unconditioned
transcendent. This unconditioned transcendent is beyond even the 
conception of a supreme being.
"In so far as any such being is assumed as existent, it is 
again annihilated in the religious act". (2)
If this representative element, what Tillich calls the "atheism
immanent in the religious act", is lost sight of then God is made into 
a 'thing' a 'being* and the religious and cultural life become 
enmeshed in idolatrous symbols and are destroyed.
(b) This second group are characterisations of the nature and actions 
of God. These presuppose God as an object and yet contain an element
(1) Tillich, P. 'R.S.' p27
(2) ibid. p27
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which indicates the symbolic character of that presupposition.
(c) The third group are the natural and historical objects which 
represent the presence of the unconditioned transcendent in the 
empirical order. Like the first group there is a double meaning 
involved, there is an unsymbolic historical and empirical reality and 
also a symbolic representation of the unconditioned transcendent. For 
example in the crucifixion of Christ you have a non-symbolic 
historical event open to historical research but you also have a 
symbolic representation of the action of the divine in the realm of 
existence.
(d) This is where Tillich appears to become confused because he
identifies the fourth group of objective religious symbols with the 
second level of symbols, namely, the self-transcending or pointing 
symbols. He calls the fourth group:
"the immensely large class of signs and actions of a special 
significance that contain a reference to religious objects 
of the first level". (1)
All of these can be thought of as symbols of the third group reduced 
to a lower power.
"They all had originally more than 'pointing' significance".(2)
Whether Tillich is saying that, before their reduction to a lower
power, they were the fourth group of objective symbols or whether he 
is saying that the objective symbols include within themselves the
'self transcending' symbols is not clear. Either way he is
unnecessarily confused at this point and could merely have delineated 
four types of religious symbol.
(1) ibid. p30
(2) ibid. p31
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Tillich's concept of God and the inseparable theory of symbolism have 
been criticised by many people. Indeed although Tillich is one of the 
most influential minds of this century there is no such thing as a 
Tillich School or even a pure Tillichian, His influence lies in
(1) Tillich, P. D.F. p54
A final element of Tillich's theory of religious symbols is his 
connection of symbol and myth. For Tillich myths are 'stories of the 
gods' and in them religious symbols are combined together in stories 
of divine-human encounters. Myths are present in every act of faith, 
they are inescapable. One myth may be replaced by another myth, as 
one symbol may be replaced by another symbol, but myth, like symbol, 
cannot be removed from man’s spiritual life. If myths cannot be 
ignored then there are two possibilities; either they are seen as 
literal explanations of the ultimate in which case they become 
idolatrous, or they become 'broken myths'. A broken myth is one which 
is understood as a myth but not removed or replaced. Tillich 
distinguishes between 'natural' and 'historical' nyths. A natural 
myth is one in which repetitive natural processes, such as the 
seasons, are understood in their ultimate meaning. A historical myth 
is one in which the ultimate is seen as acting in human history.
"If the Christ - a transcendent, divine being - appears in 
the fullness of time, lives, dies and is resurrected, this |
is an historical myth.... Christianity speaks the 
mythological language like every other religion. It is a 
broken myth, but it is a myth; otherwise Christianity would 
not be an expression of ultimate concern". (1) |
I
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Is1provocation and in specific areas rather than in total acceptance of 
his system. It has been said that any theologian who wishes to 
seriously grapple with his subject must go through Tillich, he cannot 
be bypassed or ignored.
(1) Hick, J.H. Philosophy of Religion. p74
John Hick points out one of Tillich's weaknesses on symbolism and at 4
the same time one of the possible weaknesses of any 'system'. He 
rather scathingly describes Tillich's theory of symbols as
"although valuably suggestive, scarcely constituting at this 
point a fully articulated philosophical position". (1)
His criticism is that Tillich does not clearly work out how technical,
theological, propositions function as symbols. He claims that f
Tillich's theory is more suited to the arts than to theological ideas. 4
I think Tillich would reply that theology does not create symbols but 
deals with them as its raw material. The symbols of the community are 
the stuff of theology, which attempts to understand and clarify them.
Theology cannot go beyond symbolism but it must always strive to keep 
the communities' symbols true and relevant. Most theological
propositions are not in themselves religious symbols but are rather 
about symbols, descriptive of them.
Hick's criticism shows the difficulty of the systematic method.
Tillich's system is so large that it is possible to find fault with 
specific areas, as no mind can encompass all areas of the system with 
equal expertise. As Bertrand Russell wrote:
30
"If... books covering a wide field are to be written at all, 
it is inevitable... that those who write such books should 
spend less time on any one part than can be spent by a man 
who concentrates on a single [area]". (1)
This is by no means an excuse for Tillich, he neither requires nor 
would want one, but it is true to say that he could never have 
followed to a conclusion every question raised by his work.
Hick's criticism is, like many others, crude and sweeping and due in 
large measure to a lack of concentrated study. I agree that there are 
unresolved confusions in Tillich's theory of symbolism but to dismiss 
it out of hand is patently nonsensical.
William Alston makes several criticisms of Tillich's theory and 
concludes that Tillich’s errors are ultimately fatal to his entire 
enterprise. Alston claims that Tillich lumps the traditional 
symbolizanda, i.e. a personal creator and all his attributes, in with 
the traditional symbols for these symbolizanda, namely, sun, kings, 
mountains etc. He argues that Tillich fails to note that,
"Whereas the objective existence of natural objects is taken 
for granted when they are treated as symbols, we can, in 
Tillich's program, treat a supernatural God and his doings, 
e.g., the incarnation, as symbols without making any 
assumption of objective existence". (2)
It is, to my mind, of no concern whatever, for Tillich, whether or not 
a symbol has objective existence. Any symbol, whether objectively
(1) Russell, B. A History of Western Philosophy. p5
(2) Alston, W. 'Tillich's Conception of a Religious Symbol', from 
Hook, S.(ed.) Religious Experience and Truth. pl6
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existent or not, is a matter of risk; and this risk is the same 
whether the symbol be an existent object or the incarnation; it is the 
risk of whether or not ultimacy is expressed or embodied.
Alston goes on to ask what it means to say that a religious symbol 
'points to' being itself. The concept of participation he finds of no 
help because all things participate in being itself. He also remains 
unclear on this point when Tillich talks about a symbol manifesting or 
mediating being itself because this means no more to him than 
participation. This is surely Alston's own problem. Tillich, 
clearly, does not mean participation and mediation to be confused. 
Everything participates in being itself to the extent that it is held 
out of non-being, but only a true symbol can mediate ultimacy. It is 
not the symbol itself but the communities' view of the symbol that 
makes it valid, dead or idolatrous.
William Rowe believes that the most plausible interpretation of the 
term "points to" is signifies. This relation of signification may be 
the result of either conscious decision which gains unconscious 
acceptance or else the result of unconscious processes. Rowe rejects 
Alston's criticism that for'X' to function as a symbol of 'Y' for 'S' 
then 'S' must be able to specify 'Y' as that which is being 
symbolised.
"The inability of religious men to specify being itself as 
that which their sacred objects signify or point to does 
not, I believe, imply that these religious objects do not 
function as symbols for being itself. It does, however, 
show rather conclusively that the relationship of 
signification in which these religious objects stand to
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being itself is not the result of conscious decision". (1)
The implication of this is, obviously, that one cannot distinguish 
between ordinary and religious symbols by what they signify; hence 
Tillich's assertion that a true symbol is one to which ultimate 
concern is directed.
One criticism of Alston's that I find sympathy with is his claim that 
Tillich fails to distinguish clearly between symbols and symbolic 
language. This is perhaps what Hick was crudely pointing towards. 
Symbolic language cannot be identified with ja symbol but Tillich does 
not fully discuss language. This does not, however, detract seriously 
from his theory of symbols or from his phenomenological description of 
religions as the growth and decay of symbols because the theory of 
symbols can stand alone, independant of a theory of religious 
language.
Alston's criticism's are not destructive of Tillich's entire system 
they are, once again, principally concerned with clarity. Alston 
wishes to be able to speak directly to God, albeit in an analogous 
fashion, and this is his basic disagreement with Tillich, he objects 
to symbolic language being made the only form of religious utterance. 
By far a better criticism of Tillich on this point comes from 
Hartshorne, and I find it rather interesting that one of the most 
perceptive and pertinent critics of Tillich's concepts of God and 
symbolism should be the process theologian.
On a number of occasions Hartshorne has touched on the differences 
between Tillich and himself over the way in which we can speak of God.
(1) Rowe, W.L. R.S.G. pl35
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Hartshorne starts with Tillich's two proposals for defining God; 
namely, (a) literally all that can be said of God is that he is being 
itself, and (b) functionally or pragmatically God can be described as 
the object of ultimate concern; and claims that these are not only 
mutually consistent but are actually equivalent : one makes deity the
universal object of possible interest, the other of possible thought. 
From this position Hartshorne claims that we can draw a number of 
literal truths about God.
"If God is literally being (reality) itself, then he 
literally has all the categorical features of reality, 
reality as conditioned and as unconditioned, as actual and 
potential, as relative and as absolute, as concrete and as 
abstract". (1)
Using Tillich's two fold definition Hartshorne claims that any 
assertion whatever must in some way qualify God. If this were not the 
case then one could not obey the commandment to turn one's whole mind, 
heart and soul to God.
"...for if I recognise the fact of John running, I have 
turned that much of my mind to John; yet I must not have 
turned even that much of my mind away from God. Hence John 
running must be an aspect of deity, no more and no less". (2) 
Hartshorne continues by objecting that it makes no sense to speak of 
"John running" as qualifying God only symbolically. If the literal 
facts about our neighbours are also facts about God then what is the
(1) Hartshorne, C. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. pl49 
(hereafter referred to as C.S.P.M.)
(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Other Great Tradition', p246
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point of denying that they are facts literally obtaining of God.
"We are to love our neighbour as he literally is, and yet to 
love God with that very aspect of our minds or hearts; and I 
conclude that the neighbour must in some appropriate and 
quite literal sense be a constituent of the divine life.
Very literally we are 'in' God, and all our properties are 
divine possessions". (1)
Hartshorne is concerned to show that God includes within himself both 
sides of the polar concepts of reality. He sees Tillich's, and 
others, denial of God as not literally cause, or as not existing, as 
an uncritical acceptance of the tradition of negative theology.
"There is a long, powerful tradition that God is the 
infinite, absolute, unconditioned, and the oversimple 
assumption that the disjunctions infinite-finite, absolute- 
relative, unconditioned-conditioned are simply exclusive". (2) 
Hartshorne sees the 'negative' theology as having a suspect modesty,
God is barred from sustaining relations, accepting the definiteness
that comes through limits, responding to the creatures and thus being 
influenced by them. God may only do these things 'symbolically', 
whatever that may mean. For Hartshorne this is to make God wooden,
stupid or an empty abstraction and he will accept none of these.
"The modesty of the negative theology is highly suspect. It 
puts an infinite human veto upon the wealth of the divine 
life, cutting if off from all but the purely abstract". (3)
(1) ibid. p246
(2) ibid. p248
(3) Hartshorne, C. C.S.P.M. pl53
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Hartshorne himself distinguishes three types of term for God:
1) plainly symbolic terms like shepherd or ruler,
2) plainly literal terms like relative or absolute,
3) 'problematic’ terms like know or love.
He prefers the term analogical to symbolic for the third type. They 
are problematic because if our idea of, for example, divine knowledge 
comes from analogical extension of our idea of human knowledge then 
these terms are purely symbolic. If, on the other hand, we follow 
Hartshorne (and Brunner) in the assertion that this is not the whole 
truth but that our idea of human knowledge, in the first place, comes 
from our intuition (Descartes' "innate idea") of God then, in so far 
as we have religious intuition, these terms are literal.
Hartshorne sees the major stumbling blocks to a clearer understanding 
of these ideas as being 'Etiolatry' (worship of cause) and 'Ontolatry' 
(worship of being-in contrast to becoming) but Tillich himself has 
shown us the answer through his twofold definition of God. All that 
is needed is for this to be "followed out without deviation or 
contrary assumption". (1) Tillich's own treatment of the problem was 
warped by his veneration for the traditional systems causing him to 
underestimate the problems.
One fundamental difference between Tillich and Hartshorne is their 
approach to logic. Tillich knowingly and blatantly, at times, 
flaunted logical argument, as Heywood Thomas recalls, for Tillich to 
call someone his logical critic was to dismiss the criticism:
"take no notice of him, he is my logical critic". (2)
(1) ibid. pl57
(2) Thomas, J.H. 'Tillich as a Philosopher of Religion', p368
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Hartshorne, on the other hand, is passionately concerned to make his 
thinking clear and rational - as he wrote in the introduction to 'The 
Logic of Perfection' he vowed at the age of seventeen always to trust 
reason and to make his thinking as logically correct and accurate as 
he could. The difference is very important if we agree with Heywood 
Thomas' assessment that Tillich expressed a vision in a schematic and 
sketchy way and that a task for philosophy of religion is to clarify 
this vision. I believe that at several points process concepts can be 
used to add clarity to Tillichian ideas but the problem remains, would 
Tillich recognise his clarified vision or in the process of attempting 
to make it more understandable do we destroy it? The pros and cons of 
the process concept of analogy as against Tillich's concept of symbol 
will be more fully explored later. Suffice to say, at present, that 
Ford sees Tillich's theory of symbolism as a necessary consequence of 
his denial of being to God which Ford believes is Tillich's principal 
mistake:
"In many respects Tillich's writings may be regarded as one 
long polemic against the view that God is a being. We feel 
this is his fundamental error. It is an error which 
jeopardizes the success of his undertaking both religiously 
and philosophically". (1)
For Ford, as for all process thinkers, Aquinas' doctrine of analogy is 
to be seen as a better guide.
[Aquinas] "... offers an alternative account of God based 
upon non-univocal prediction, incorporating the principle 
that God is a being. This is the key to the superiority of 
analogy. It cannot be found in the methodological details
(i) Ford, L.S. 'Tillich and Thomas : The Analogy of Being'. p243
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«of the theory of analogy contrasted with the theory of the 
symbol, but must be sought in the general continuity or 
discontinuity of being". (1)
As shall be seen later the doctrine of creation is also a major area 
of disagreement between Tillich and process. However, it is not only 
process writers who have been critical of Tillich's formulation of 
this doctrine. Tillich claims that Creatio ex nihilo is a rejection 
of paganism, it is the doctrine which distinguishes Christian thought 
from any form of paganism. The term ^  nihilo serves two purposes; 
firstly it acts as a rejection of dualism and secondly it:
"...says something fundamentally important about the 
creature, namely, that it must take over what might be 
called 'the heritage of non-being'. Creatureliness implies 
non-being, but creatureliness is more than non-being. It
carries in itself the power of being, and this power of
being is its participation in being itself, in the creative I
ground of being". (2)
Tillich sees the doctrine as containing two basic truths; firstly that 4
the tragic character of existence is not rooted in the creative ground 
and so does not belong to the essential nature of things; and secondly 
that there is an element of non-being implicit in creatureliness so 
that although the tragic is not necessary it is always potential.
Heywood Thomas criticises Tillich on two points. Firstly, he rightly 
points out that there are numerous instances of such a doctrine in 
Greek thought, especially post Aristotelian, and that the only
(1) ibid. p243
(2) Tillich, P. S.T. I p281
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biblical reference to creatio ex nihilo is II Maccabees 7 v.28, which 
is pre-christian. Hence Tillich's claim that this doctrine;
is the mark of distinction between paganism, even in 
its most refined form, and Christianity, even in its most 
primitive form". (1) 
is clearly spurious. Secondly, Thomas criticises Tillich for making 
non-being into a personal matter.
"He makes the 'nothing' out of which we come into a 
something with fatal power. Hence, as I suggested, we are 
once more faced with Dualism". (2)
Thomas sees no benefit to be gained from Tillich's concept of non- 
being.
"The only meaning we can give to 'non-being' is the denial 
of the 'being' of something. Therefore to say that 
'creatureliness implies non-being' either is a useless 
tautology or is meaningless". (3)
It is, for Thomas, an example of a fallacy which is present throughout 
Tillich's writings.
"The fallacy that the existence of a word implies the 
existence of a thing results in a great deal of confusion in 
Tillich's thought". (4)
This is a telling criticism of Tillich but it only partially explains 
his insistence on the necessity of non-being. The primary reason for
(1) ibid. p281
(2) Thomas, J.H. Paul Tillich ; An Appraisal. p73
(3) ibid. p72
(4) ibid. p73
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this is not a linguistic error but rather Tillich's conviction that he 
had experienced the threat of non-being; and that this could only be 
explained by the ontological existence of non-being as a possibility, 
and overcome by the existence of God as Being itself. While it is 
outside the scope of this study it is interesting to speculate to what 
extent Tillich's thought on this point was influenced by his 
background in Germany and his emigration to America.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Concept of God in Whitehead and Hartshorne.
This chapter is concerned with an exposition of the process concept of 
God. Firstly, though, a definition of what is meant by process is 
required. For the purposes of this study I will agree with what Lewis
Ford calls the "many", for whom "process theology primarily means the
joint impact of Whitehead and Hartshorne"(1). However, a note of 
caution needs to be sounded. It must be asked how uniform their
thought really is. Can we, as has often been done, call Hartshorne a
Whiteheadian? William Lad Sessions claims, rightly, that if by 
Whiteheadian we mean a disciple of Whitehead not merely a holder of 
similar views then the answer must be no.
"Historically or biographically speaking .... Hartshorne is 
not a 'Whiteheadian’". He "simply did not derive most (nor 
perhaps the most basic) of his philosphical tenets from 
Whitehead"(2).
As Sessions also points out, this conviction leads to the necessity of 
considering
"whether Hartshorne's doctrines mean the same as 
Whitehead's, even when they are couched in similar (or even 
identical) language"(3).
As a result of an examination of Hartshorne's unpublished doctoral 
thesis Sessions has concluded that virtually all Hartshorne's mature
(1) Ford, L.S. (ed) Two Process Philosophers ; Hartshorne's 
Encounter with Whitehead, pi (hereafter referred to as T.P.P.)
(2) Sessions, W.L. from Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. plO
(3) ibid. plO
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philosophy was developed prior to his contact with Whitehead. The %1
chief exception being his doctrine of God which did later come to be
couched in Whiteheadian terms.
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"iEven here though it is arguable whether Whitehead’s influence was not i
one of clarification rather than alteration. Whichever be the case I 
believe it is safe to assume that the two men do in fact mean the same 
things apart from the areas of (quite distinct) disagreement. I shall 
therefore, investigate primarily Whitehead’s description of the 
concept of God and look later at Hartshorne's areas of disagreement 
with this.
As far as Whitehead is concerned there is but one religious dogma in 
debate: "What do you mean by ’God’?", for him "that is the fundamental 
religious dogma and all other dogma's are subsidiary to it" (1).
Whitehead approaches the concept of God from a philosophical rather 
than a theological angle. He begins with his metaphysical system and 
introduces God, not as an after-thought, but because he is required 
within the system as the principle of 'limitation' or 'concretion'. 4
This immediately introduces one of the strengths of the process system 
as against classical theism. God is a necessary and integral part of 
the system, as Whitehead writes,
"God is not to be treated as an exception to all 
metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse.
He is their chief exemplification" (2).
(1) Whitehead, A.N. Religion in the Making. p56 (hereafter referred 
to as R.M.)
(2) Whitehead, A.N. Process and Reality. p486 (page nos. refer to 
C.U.P edition 1929) (hereafter referred to as P.R.)
■Ï
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Whitehead’s thought, quite naturally, develops through his writings. 
The first real exposition of his concept of God comes in 
'Science and the Modern World* (hereafter referred to as S.M.W.) 
published in 1926 and based primarily on his Lowell lectures of 1925. 
Whitehead here agrees with Spinoza that there is one ultimate reality 
actualising itself in all the entities we can know or think. In this 
sense there is substance. Whitehead disagrees with Spinoza, however, 
as to the nature of this substance. For him it is not a static entity 
undergoing change but is the 'ongoingness of things'. Thus Whitehead 
calls this ultimate, "substantial activity" and affirms it as the 
ultimate reality at the base of things.
This substantial activity is totally formless yet can only occur as a 
definite entity which can be either an actual entity or an eternal 
object. Thus these forms are called attributes of substantial 
activity. Whitehead introduces, as a third attribute of substantial 
activity, the principle of limitation. This metaphysical principle he 
uses to answer the problem of determination in the world. For 
example, both substantial activity and the realm of pure possibility 
are neutral with respect to what kind of actual entities shall occur, 
and therefore, without some kind of principle of determination, 
concretion, or limitation there would be no explanation of consistency 
in the world:
"...We must provide a ground for limitation which stands 
among the attributes of the substantial activity. This 
attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be 
given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate 
limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality.
For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it 
stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but he
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is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be 
given for the nature of God, because that nature is the 
ground of rationality." (1)
By identifying God with the principle of limitation it can be seen 
that Whitehead is breaking with traditional theism. Christian 
tradition demands that God be identified with the ultimate, i.e. with 
substantial activity and not with one of its attributes. Whitehead's 
reason for denying the metaphysical ultimacy of God is that he is
convinced that the object of religious concern is more correctly
characterised by goodness rather than ultimacy. Whitehead insists 
that if God be identified as the metaphysical ultimate then:
"...there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the 
origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the 
supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be 
ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be 
conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in 
his very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to 
establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme'". (2)
In 'Religion in the Making' (hereafter referred to as R.M. ), the text 
of Whitehead's 1926 Lowell lectures, he describes how the principle of 
limitation works.
"The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing 
actual which could be actual without some measure of order.
(1) Whitehead, A.N. Science and the Modern World. p256-257 (page
nos. refer to C.U.P edition 1926) (hereafter referred to as
S.M.W.)
(2) ibid p258
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The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: that the
order of the world,the depth of reality of the world, the 
value of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty 
of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life and the 
mastery of evil are all bound together - not accidentally, 
but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a
creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with 
infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these
forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from
the completed ideal harmony which is God."(l)
Thus God functions as the principle of limitation by ordering the 
infinite possibilities of the eternal objects according to principles 
of value which stem from his nature as the completed ideal harmony.
Cobb has pointed out a distinct and important change in Whitehead's 
concept of God between the publication of S.M.W. and R.M. In the 
former Whitehead regarded God as non-concrete or non-actual, but in
the latter God is described as an actual entity. The reason for this
seems to be that in order to function in any way as a limiting factor 
to ensure order and value God has to be an actual entity as, according 
to the ontological principle, only an actual entity can act. Having 
described God as an actual entity it is to be noted that He is a very 
special case.
"God is that non-temporal actuality which has to be taken 
account of in every creative phase." (2)
This non-temporal actuality is needed because:
(1) Whitehead, A.N. R.M. pl05-106
(2) ibid. p81
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"...the boundless wealth of possibility in the realm of
(1) ibid. p81-82
(2) ibid. p85-86
(3) ibid. pl43
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abstract form would leave each creative phase still &
indeterminate,... the definite determination which imposes |
iordered balance on the world requires an actual entity 
imposing its own unchanging consistency of character on 
every phase". (1)
God, to be non-temporal, must be free from internal inconsistency,
hence, he must include within himself a synthesis of the total 4i.
"Cuniverse.
"There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of the
realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of
the world as qualified by the realm of forms. His
completion, so that he is exempt from transition into 
something else, must mean that his nature remains self
consistent in relation to all change." (2) |
This would seem to imply that God is affected by the world, and 
Whitehead goes on to stress this point.
"His purpose in the world is quality of attainment. His 
purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant 
to the actual state of the world. Thus all attainment is
immortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are God 
in the world as it is now. Every act leaves the world with 
a deeper or fainter impression of God. He then passes into 
his next relation to the world with enlarged or diminished 
presentation of ideal values." (3)
Cobb provides an accurate and succinct summary of the principle 
differences between S.M.W. and R.M. as follows:
"In S.M.W. we encountered four metaphysical principles: the
underlying substantial activity and its three attributes - 
eternal objects, actual entities, and the principle of 
limitation. In R.M. subtle but important changes have
occurred in the understanding of these four elements in the 
philosophic system. First, the underlying substantial
activity is now called creativity (and plays a minor role). 
Whereas substantial activity was that of which all the other 
three were attributes, creativity is accorded no such 
favoured place. Complete interdependence of the four 
principles is stressed rather than the primacy of any one.
Second, since God is now conceived as an actual entity, we
might consider the four metaphysical principles as reduced 
to three: creativity, eternal objects, and actual entities
including God as a special case. If we do so, however, we 
have to remember that there is a major philosophical 
difference between God and the temporal actual activities." (1) 
This is essentially Whitehead’s final position. God is an actual 
entity who orders and limits the realm of pure possibility so that 
each new entity can occur. The world in its turn, as we have seen, 
acts on God, affecting the way in which he in future will react with 
the world. Whitehead's greatest exposition of his concept of God, 
which is to be found in his 1927-28 Gifford lectures published as
(1) Cobb, J.B. A Christian Natural Theology. pl49 (hereafter 
referred to as C.N.T.)
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’Process and Reality’ in 1929 (hereafter referred to as P.R.), adds 
nothing substantially new to this position but serves to expand and 
clarify.
In view of P.R. we can explore more fully the way in which God 
functions as the principle of limitation and the way in which this 
principle functions in the actual world.
Each actual occasion has a subjective aim at a determinate 
satisfaction. However, each occasion is necessarily limited in its 
choice of aim; otherwise order would not exist or would be due to 
sheer chance. The limits on the self determination of an actual 
occasion are set in the initial phase of the subjective aim. This is 
normally referred to, by Whitehead, as the initial aim. This initial 
aim is provided by the principle of limitation and determines what 
locus or standpoint will be occupied by each occasion and, therefore, 
which other occasions will be adjacent to it in the space-time 
continuum, and so prehended by it. The initial aim also determines 
the satisfaction initially aimed at and, therefore, influences the 
satisfaction eventually actualised. It cannot, however, determine
this final satisfaction. The initial aim implies that each actual 
occasion is confronted by a range of related and relevant
possibilities, which are determined by limits required for the 
maintenance of minimal order. One of the possibilities is, of course,
ideal and it is this at which the initial aim is directed. However,
the actual occasion is able to choose any possibility and the amount 
of self-determination it has is such that if it chooses to reject the 
ideal possibilities in favour of those of lesser value then higher 
levels of order are subject to destruction. In this way Whitehead 
accounts for the historical oscillation between order and decay and
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shows how the cosmos is sensitively balanced between freedom and 
determination. Man is neither totally determined nor totally free, 
but his freedom is real, it is not illusory or fake. Man has the
power to enhance or diminish the value of the cosmos.
It is time to examine more closely Whitehead’s concept of ’eternal 
objects’ especially as this is one of the major areas of disagreement
between himself and Hartshorne. In P.R. Whitehead defines an eternal
object as:
"...any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve 
a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the 
temporal world." (1)
The eternal objects are very similar to Platonic ’forms’, the 
principal difference being that Whitehead does not assign ontological 
status to them. For him ontological status belongs only to actual 
entities. However, because of the ontological principle which allows 
action only to actual entities there is the problem of how the merely 
potential eternal objects can have any effect in the world. They must 
in some way participate in actuality and yet their effectiveness 
cannot be dependant upon their prior actualisation, otherwise there 
could be no novelty. Whitehead’s answer is that they participate in 
God’s actuality. They are ’real’ because they are envisaged by God. 
Here we have yet another reason for the necessity of God, without him 
there could be no eternal objects and no novelty. Thus God is both 
the "principle of limitation and the organ of novelty". (2)
Whitehead goes on to classify eternal objects according to their
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p60
(2) Cobb, J.B. C.N.T. pl61
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primary modes of ingression into actual entities. He outlines three 
possible modes of ingression but only in two of these is the eternal 
objects’ functioning unrestrictedly realised. These ways of 
functioning are:
"(i) it can be an element in the definiteness of some 
objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity which is 
the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the 
definiteness of the subjective form of some feeling; or 
(iii) it can be an element in the datum of a conceptual, or 
propositional, feeling". (1)
In the third mode the function of the eternal object is not 
immediately realised. It is merely the conceptual valuation of the
potential ingression in one of the other modes. When Whitehead 
examines the question of whether or not all eternal objects are 
capable of ingression in either mode he concludes that in fact they 
are not and he thus classifies eternal objects into two species, the 
’objective’ and the’subjective’.
"An eternal object of the objective species can only obtain 
ingression in the first mode, and never in the second mode.
It is always, in its unrestricted realisation, an element in 
the definiteness of an actual entity, or a nexus, which is
the datum of a feeling belonging to the subject in
question... Its sole avocation is to be an agent in 
objectification. It can never be an element in the
definiteness of a subjective form. The solidarity of the 
world rests upon the incurable objectivity of this species
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p412
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of eternal objects." (1)
Whitehead goes on to describe this species of eternal objects as the 
mathematical Platonic forms. They concern the world as a medium.
The subjective species of eternal objects, on the other hand, are 
primarily elements in the definiteness of the subjective form of a 
feeling. A subjective eternal object:
"...is a determinate way in which a feeling can feel. It is 
an emotion, or an intensity, or an adversion or an aversion, 
or a pleasure, or a pain. It defines the subjective form of 
feeling of one actual entity. A* may be that component of
A's constitution through which A is objectified for B. Thus
when B feels A*, it feels 'A with that feeling*. In this
way, the eternal object which contributes to the
definiteness of, A ’s feeling becomes an eternal object 
contributing to the definiteness of A as an objective datum 
in B’s prehension of A." (2)
Therefore eternal objects of the subjective species can function in
two ways. They can function subjectively and relatively and therefore
are open to ingression through either of the two primary modes.
One final area of Whitehead’s thought, regarding eternal objects, 
which requires attention is his definition of God’s ordering of them 
as primordial and eternally unchanging. Infact, for Whitehead, God’s 
primordial nature is constituted by this eternal envisagement of
possibility. Later process writers have interpreted this in several
(1) ibid. p412
(2) ibid. p413
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ways. John Cobb in his ’A Christian Natural Theology’ claims that the 
eternal ordering is not to be seen as a single order but as an 
indefinite variety of orders which foresaw and evaluated every
possible state of the actual world. Thus God does not reorder the 
eternal objects for each novel occasion but the eternal objects are 
ordered from eternity for each possible novel occasion, and this 
ordering provides the initial aim which limits, but does not
determine, the actual occasion. As Cobb writes:
"God’s ordering of possibilities is such that every possible 
state of the actual world is already envisioned as 
possible...Thus one primordial ordering of eternal objects 
is relevant to every actuality with perfect specificity." (1) 
Lewis Ford, on the other hand, sees this as an incorrect
interpretation. For him the complete envisagement of all eternal 
objects was non-temporal or atemporal and never actually occurs in
time.
"I think it would be more accurate to say that God never (at
no time) prehends all the eternal objects. There is no one
particular time or other when he prehends all of them." (2)
Ford criticises Cobb’s position for presenting a fully programmed 
future where one merely follows through a "crystalline structure of
branching alternative possibilities". His own position can, however, 
maintain the temporal emergence of possibility in terms of 
propositions.
(1) Cobb, J.B. C.N.T. pl51-156
(2) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.F.P. p59
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"In fact, all of God’s conceptual entertainment of eternal 
objects with respect to time requires propositional feeling.
The integration of his pure conceptual feelings of the 
eternal objects with indicative feelings derived from his 
consequent nature is the way in which portions of the 
primordial nature become temporally emergent. Since that 
nature is infinite and inexhaustible, at no time has it (or 
will it) become fully emergent in time. Whatever God 
physically prehends of the actual world, he experiences ever 
afterwards, but he conceptually prehends (in temporal 
propositional feeling) only those eternal objects relevant 
to his physical experience.’’ (1)
Hartshorne interprets Whitehead in a similar way to Cobb but he shares 
Ford’s dislike of such a position and so rejects the concept of 
eternal objects all together, I will return to this later, it is 
sufficient to point out at present that Hartshorne could never agree 
with Ford’s interpretation because of his principle of temporal 
restriction which implies that if God's primordial nature exists then 
it must exist in time. Ford argues, and I think with some veracity, 
that:
"If all real possibility is dependant on past actuality, 
then it is temporally emergent, even for God. If there are 
also pure possibilities, they are grounded in what is purely 
non-temporal, and there is no need to assume (apart from the 
Hartshornean principle of temporal restriction) that these 
must be entertained by God at some time or other." (2)
(1) ibid. p61
(2) ibid. p62
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This rejection by Hartshorne of eternal objects together with other 
implications of his more thorough going temporalism will be fully 
examined later. At this point I will return to Whitehead and examine 
a vital part of his concept of God so far only briefly mentioned. 
This is what Whitehead calls the consequent nature of God, in other 
words the effect that the world has upon God. As Whitehead writes 
that "analogous to all actual entities, the nature of God is di-polar" 
(1), it is firstly necessary to summarise the dipolar nature of actual 
entities.
An actual entity in the temporal world has two poles, a physical and a 
mental pole:
"The actual entity on its physical side is composed of its 
determinate feelings of its actual world, and on its mental 
side is originated by its conceptual appetitions." (2)
Whitehead also refers to the mental pole as conceptual or consequent. 
Conceptual experience can, he says, be infinite but physical 
experience by its very nature is finite.
"An actual entity in the temporal world is to be conceived 
as originated by physical experience with its process of 
completion motivated by consequent, conceptual experience 
initially derived from God." (3)
This dipolar nature of actual entities is also expressed in 
Whitehead’s ninth Categoreal Obligation, the category of freedom and 
determination, which states that:
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p488
(2) ibid. p62
(3) ibid. p489
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"The concrescence of each individual actual entity is 
internally determined and is externally free." (1)
"Thus the process of becoming is dipolar, (i) by reason of 
its qualification by the determinateness of the actual 
world, and (ii) by its conceptual prehensions of the
indeterminateness of eternal objects. The process is 
constituted by the influx of eternal objects into a novel 
determinateness of feeling which absorbs the actual world 
into a novel actuality". (2)
In what way is God’s dipolarity analogous to an actual entities? 
Whitehead refers to God as having a primordial and a consequent nature 
where the primordial nature corresponds to the conceptual, mental,
pole of an actual occasion and the consequent nature corresponds to 
the physical pole. Unlike all other actual entities God’s nature is 
firstly conceptual and is completed by the addition of physical
feelings.
"The completeness of God’s nature into a fullness of 
physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the 
world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual 
world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as 
a novel element in God’s objectification of that actual 
world." (3)
Thus Whitehead can sum up the two sides of God’s nature as follows;
On one hand his infinite, primordial nature is -
(1) ibid. p37
(2) ibid. p62
(3) ibid. p488
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(1) ibid. p489
(2) ibid. p489
(3) ibid. p490
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"...free, completely primordial, eternal, actually deficient 
and unconscious."
On the other hand, his consequent nature -
"...originates with physical experience derived from the |
temporal world, and then acquires integration with the 4
primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent,
’everlasting', fully actual, and conscious." (1)
It is through God’s consequent nature that he has a relationship with 
the world. God is tender, wise, and patient. He prehends every 
actuality for what it can be in a perfected system. He is the 
judgement of the world, through tenderness saving all that can be 
saved and through wisdom using what, for the temporal world, is only 
rubbish. God's infinite patience causes him to continue preserving 
the world as it passes away.
"The revolts of destructive evil, purely self regarding are 
dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; 
and yet the good they did achieve in individual joy, 
individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast, 
is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole. (2)
God’s role:
"...lies in the patient operation of the overpowering 
rationality of his conceptual harmonisation. He does not 
create the world, he saves it; or, more accurately, he is 
the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by 
his vision of truth, beauty and goodness." (3)
I
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Obviously Whitehead is going against the traditional concepts of God 
but he maintains that he is being true to basic religious intuition. 
His system is only relevant if it can do justice to both science and 
religion, if it is a harmonious system in which all parts are 
necessary and nothing is added for reasons of pure faith. Whitehead 
claims that the classical concept of a static God and a fluent 
universe is a misrepresentation of religious insight, which is of 
permanence in fluency and fluency in permanence. For Whitehead the 
problem is that of:
"...actuality with permanence, requiring fluency as its 
completion; and actuality with fluency, requiring permanence 
as its completion." (1)
Although Whitehead sees God and the world as analogous and although he 
describes God not as an exception to metaphysical principles but as 
their chief exemplification he also sees God and the world as being 
contrasting opposites. God is not the world and the world is not God. 
However these opposed elements stand to each other in mutual 
requirement. God does not, in fact, have ontological superiority over 
the world.
"Neither God nor the world reaches static completion. Both 
are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the 
creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the 
world, is the instrument of novelty for the other." (2)
God and the world always move conversely to each other. God is
primordially one and aquires a consequent multiplicity, which the
(1) ibid. p49I
(2) ibid. p493-494
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This is the consequent nature of God which is demanded by the 
principle of universal relativity (if the world is relative to God 
then God must be relative to the world). But this principle also 
implies that the world will, in turn, be affected by God's consequent 
nature. As Whitehead puts it:
"This nature itself [God’s consequent nature] passes into 
the temporal world according to its gradation of relevance 
to the various concrescent occasions. There are thus four
(1) ibid. p494
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primordial character absorbs back into its own unity. The world is 
primordially many and in the process it aquires a unity, which is a 
novel occasion, which it absorbs back into its primordial 4
multiplicity. So Whitehead can write that:
"...the theme of cosmology, which is the basis of all 
religions, is the story of the dynamic effort of the world 
passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of 
God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by 
absorption of the world’s multiplicity of effort." (1)
God is the great preserver. As each actuality attains satisfaction, 
and so passes into novelty, it is preserved in God; not as temporal 
actuality but as a living, ever present, fact. It is transformed and 
perfected by God into a fulfilment of his primordial vision. In this 
way God is completed by individual satisfactions of actual occasions, 
and the temporal occasions are completed by their everlasting unity 
with their transformed selves. This is the way in which God uses all 
that can be used and saves all that can be saved from each temporal 
occasion.
creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its 
actuality. There is first the phase of conceptual 
origination, deficient in actuality, but infinite in its 
adjustment of valuation. Secondly, there is the temporal 
phase of physical origination with its multiplicity of 
actualities. In this phase full actuality is attained; but 
there is deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with 
each other... Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected 
actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without 
the qualification of any loss either of individual identity 
or of completeness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy 
is reconciled with objective immortality... In the fourth 
phase, the creative action completes itself. For the 
perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and 
qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality 
includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience." (1) 
Whitehead moves from philosophical to theological language when he 
calls the action of this fourth phase the outpouring of the love of 
God.
"It is the particular providence for particular occasions.
What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in 
heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the 
world.... The love in the world passes into the love in 
heaven and floods back again into the world. In this sense.
(1) ibid. p496-497
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1God is the great companion - the fellow sufferer who
understands." (1)
And in this way it can be said that the kingdom of heaven is with us
today, it is here and now.
Another Whiteheadian concept requiring some clarification is that of 
objective immortality. For Whitehead an actual entity is only a 
feeling subject whilst it is in a process of becoming (this contrasts 
with Hartshorne as shall be seen later), once it has achieved 
satisfaction it loses subjectivity and becomes a being, a pure object.
An actual entity is both a subject and a superject. As a subject it
presides over its own immediacy of becoming, and as a superject it is
the atomic creature which can exercise its function of objective
immortality. As a 'being* it belongs to its very nature to be a
potential for future 'becoming'. Whitehead uses Locke's definition of
time as a 'perpetual perishing'.
"In the philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which
is permanent, but 'form'. Forms suffer changing relations; 
actual entities 'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are
immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires 
objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy." (2)
Immortality rests only in God, only God can overcome the ultimate evil :|
which lies in the very fact that the past fades and perpetually 
perishes. Each actual entity is transformed in God into a living, 
ever present fact.
"In this way the insistent craving is justified - the
(1) ibid. p497
(2) ibid. p40
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insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by 
the ever present, unfading importance of our immediate 
actions, which perish and yet live forevermore." (1)
Of course only God enjoys the unfading importance of our immediate 
actions, only God enjoys the ever present value of past actualities. 
For us it must be sufficient that we contribute to the divine and 
through him we contribute to the world.
As something of an aside at this point I think it important to mention 
that while Whitehead explains the action of God in terms of a
principle of determination, and although God is seen as a constituent
element in a wider metaphysical system, his mystery is not destroyed. 
He can never be fully explained, for as I have quoted previously; 
"...his existence is the ultimate irrationality... No reason 
can be given for the nature of God because that nature is 
the ground of rationality... There is a metaphysical need 
for a principle of determination, but there can be no 
metaphysical reason for what is determined." (2)
This makes a fascinating parallel with Tillich which will be fully 
explored later. Tillich would also see God as the ground of reason.
Perhaps the difference is that for Whitehead God cannot be explained
but he can to a large extent be analogously describe by metaphysics, 
while for Tillich God cannot be explained nor can he be described, 
except symbolically.
Apart from the major differences between Hartshorne and Whitehead, 
outlined below, the above exposition will be taken as the description
(1) ibid. p497
(2) Whitehead, A.N. S.M.W. p257
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of the process concept of God for the purpose of comparison with 
Tillich. As this latter comparison is the principle concern of this 
study I will take for granted Hartshorne's areas of agreement with 
Whitehead and examine only the areas of difference.
The two areas of disagreement which are vital for our purposes concern 
(a) the dipolar nature of God, and (b) the concept of eternal objects. 
Both men conceive of God as being dipolar, in other words they both 
wish to ascribe the two sides of the categoreal contrasts to him. The 
difference in their thought arises from the way this dipolarity is 
conceived. Whitehead believes that God is a 'primordial actual 
entity’ who, analogously to all actual entities, has a primordial 
nature and a consequent nature which correspond to the mental pole and 
physical pole of an actual occasion. Hartshorne criticises this view 
as making God:
"...precisely that sheer exception to categoreal principles
which Whitehead says must be avoided." (1)
Hartshorne proposes a definition of God as a ’personally ordered 
society' of actual occasions.
"Thus there is no one entity called God qua consequent, but 
an endless accumulation of consequent states of deity, each 
of which sums up all its predecessors." (2)
This difference is due in large measure to Hartshorne's more through 
going temporalism. Ford is correct when he points to a distinction 
between two modes of unification, which he calls, 'conceptual 
unification* and 'perspectival elimination'.
(1) Hartshorne, C. In answer to a question on process, from Rome, S.
and Rome, B. (Eds.) Philosophical Interrogations p324
(2) ibid. p323
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treated as a personally ordered society.
This position is, however, incompatible with relativity physics which 
denies any idea of a cosmic 'now', because the idea of a single strand
of divine occasions implies a 'now* with a settled past and an open
future. In view of this difficulty Hartshorne suggested a possible 
revision to his view, although it appears that his preference remained 
for the original position. His revision is to see God as a:
"society of societies, a multiplicity of persons - somewhat 
analogous to classical trinitarian views." (2)
(1) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p66
(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Whitehead in French Perspective ; A review
article'. The Thomist 33/3, July 1969. p578 - Quoted from Ford,
L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p36
63
"In physical, spatiotemporal unification, where the physical 
pole is prior, incompatible aspects of the many occasions of :
the past actual world are perspectivally eliminated to 
conform to the specific standpoint of the concrescing 
occasion. In conceptual unification on the other hand, such 
incompatibilities are not eliminated, since everything is i
positively prehended within an all inclusive unity, and they .1
are absorbed into a wider harmony of meaning... Such 
conceptual unification is non-temporal, not restricted to i
any one place or time by perspectival elimination." (1) ■
This non-temporal, conceptual unification is in fact, for Whitehead, i
God's primordial nature, his primordial envisagement of all pure ?
possibility. For Hartshorne though this cannot be. All actuality 
must be temporal, therefore, conceptual unification cannot occur and -vIto treat God as a single actual entity is impossible. He must be
Griffin has pointed out that this is very similar to Ford's idea of 
God as a single actual entity, an'everlasting concrescence'. Ford 
agrees but notes that it still sees;
"...the mode of divine unification as spatiotemporal rather 
than non-temporal." (1)
And as such it is a departure from Whitehead.
What then are the implications of the fact that Whitehead and 
Hartshorne construe God differently? In Whitehead the description of 
God as an actual entity allows him to make the claim that God is both 
analogous to the world (he is the chief exemplification of the 
metaphysical principles) and yet distinct from the world. In P.R. he 
writes :
"...an actual entity has a threefold character: (i) it has
the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the 
subjective character aimed at in the process of 
concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which 
is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction 
qualifying the transcendent creativity."
Hence the physical pole, of the prehension of past occasions, takes 
precedence. In the case of God, however:
"...there is no past. Thus the ideal realisation of 
conceptual feeling takes the precedence. God differs from 
other actual entities in the fact that Hume's principle, of 
the derivative character of conceptual feelings, does not 
hold for him." (2)
(1) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p66
(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. pl21
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For Hartshorne, however, the question of distinction between God and 
the world is perhaps a little more difficult and it involves our 
second major difference between the two men, namely Hartshorne's 
denial of eternal objects. For both men it can be said that what 
distinguishes God from the world is his primordial or, to use 
Hartshorne's term, absolute pole. For Whitehead God is distinguished 
from the world by both the content of the primordial nature (eternal 
objects or pure possibility) and the relationship of the primordial 
nature to the consequent nature. For Hartshorne on the other hand, 
God is a series of actual occasions and so cannot be dipolar in 
Whitehead's sense. Nor can his abstract pole be equated with the 
envisagement of eternal objects because Hartshorne denies any such 
concept. Therefore we must examine what, for Hartshorne, constitutes 
God's abstract pole inorder to discover what distinguishes God from 
the world.
As we have seen, God's dipolarity, for Hartshorne, cannot be conceived 
of as analogous to dipolarity in an actual entity but rather:
"...as analogous to the distinction between a man's enduring 
character, on the one hand, and the concrete states of his 
existence which instantiate this abstract character, on the 
other." (1)
Ralph James calls this example of human character a model, which 
Hartshorne analogically raises to its highest power.
"The basic difference [writes Hartshorne] between man and 
God can be seen in this, that whereas the character 
individual to a man cannot be stated in merely abstract 
terms... God's character on the contrary, can be described
(1) Griffin, D.R. from Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p36
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in utterly abstract terms which yet are unique to him as the 
one divine individual. Only one individual can ever be 
omniscient, primordial - and - everlasting, all loving, 
supreme cause of all effects, supreme effect of all causes.
Only one individual can ever be divine." (1)
According to James it is in Anselm that Hartshorne finds the key to
God’s abstract aspect; namely, the pure necessity of God’s abstract 
identity. Hartshorne writes.
"The divine necessity is that such abstract traits or
’perfections' as 'knowing all there is to know' must be
realised in some concrete form, with respect to some 
concrete world of knowable things, but not necessarily in 
the form or with respect to the world which actually 
obtains." (2)
Such necessity is;
"...abstract or impoverished to the uttermost, and only 
therefore does it conflict with nothing, being the mere 
point of agreement of all possible truths or realities." (3)
It is perhaps now possible to see why Hartshorne refers to God's two 
aspects as abstract and concrete, rather than primordial and 
consequent.
(1) Hartshorne, C. The Divine Relativity. p80 (hereafter referred
to as D.R.)
(2) Hartshorne, C. Anselm's Discovery. p47 quoted from James, R.E.
The Concrete God, pi14
(3) Hartshorne, C. Anselm's Basic Writings. Introduction; Quoted
from James, R.E. The Concrete God. pll4
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James sees Hartshorne's position as following logically from his 
method, which is rigidly followed and which James symbolises as C)A 
where:
C* the concrete
)= is greater than and includes 
A= the abstract
"C)A means that the inclusive concrete contains the 
abstract; is ontologically prior to the abstract; precedes 
the abstract temporally; and that the changing concrete is 
superior to abstractions which do not change." (1)
This is an excellent description of Hartshorne's method but it 
introduces a great question mark about the religious suitability of 
his concept of God. Obviously finitude is the concrete pole of the 
finite - infinite contrast and infinity is the abstraction. But, 
following Hartshorne's method, the finite aspect of God includes, and 
is greater than the infinite. In all aspects taken together, 
therefore, God is finite. Lewis Ford makes the same point.
"Hartshorne’s God, defined basically in terms of his
consequent states, is at all times finite, even though this
finitude is ever expanding and always includes all the
actuality that is or ever was. Whitehead's God, defined 
basically in terms of his non-temporal actuality, is
infinite. Spinoza was correct in arguing that an infinite 
God could only create an infinite world but wrong in 
identifying this world with the world of actuality rather 
than the world of possibility." (2)
(1) James, R.E. The Concrete God. p58
(2) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p79
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Thus Whitehead's God is here perhaps superior to Hartshorne's because
he is more worthy of worship, being essentially the infinite wealth of
possibility aquiring finitude from the world. While the world is
essentially finite, acquiring a measure of infinity from God. 
Obviously Hartshorne does not accept such criticism. For him
classical theism has become somewhat side tracked into the worship of
infinity. For him the God of religion is not, or should not
necessarily be, abstract, immutable, and infinite. He attacks the
"false modesty" of the 'negative theology' which claims that human
concepts such as relative, definite, or finite, cannot properly apply 
to God.
"I think, however, that the modesty is only apparent. We
dare to forbid God to sustain relations, to accept the
definiteness that comes through limits , to respond to the 
creatures and thus be influenced by them. He may, we
concede, do these things 'symbolically', whatever that may
mean, but we tell him in no uncertain terms that he must not
literally do them! Is this modesty - or is it monstrous
presumption? Have we this veto power upon divinity?" (1)
He admits that for some his theological standpoint will appear to 
neglect the infinite gulf between God and his creatures but defends 
himself by claiming that,
"...between the finite - infinite individual and the merely 
finite individuals there is a gap in natures which is
literally infinite... God both infinitely precedes and
infinitely outlasts every other individual, so that all are
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the other Great Tradition’ Anglican 
Theological Review. 43, 1961, p250
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influenced by, and also influence, his actuality..* The real |
trouble is less in the exaggeration of literalness than in
the idolatry of infinity, being, cause, and absoluteness,
accepted as substitutes for the divine unity of the
contraries, finite - infinite, being - creativity, cause -
effect, absolute - relational, being as such and a^ being.
God is, in diverse aspects of his reality, on both sides of 
these polarities." (1)
Thus Hartshorne will never admit that his God is unsuitable for 
religious purposes. Although it is hard to see how his God avoids 
being primarily finite the question seems unimportant. What is 
stressed is the fact that God encompasses both sides of the categoreal
contrasts and must never be limited to just one.
I
The difference in Whitehead and Hartshorne*s conceptualisation of God 
at this point shows that the concept of dipolarity is used to resolve 
different problems in their respective systems.
"Whitehead's God already enjoyed the entire wealth of 
conceptual possibility, but he was only very thinly 
personal... The problem was to render him more personal, 
more involved in the world, and this was effected by adding 
physical feelings to his conceptual feelings and integrating 
the two. Hartshorne's God was already personal and all 
inclusive. Dipolarity permitted a clear distinction between 
the universal and the concrete, such that the divine essence 
could be seen as included within (prehended by) God's 
concrete states." (2)
(1) ibid. p259
(2) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p8
e
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Another related point at which the two thinkers diverge is that of the 
nature of divine activity. Colin Gunton criticises Hartshorne’s 
conception of God in the following passage.
"What is the polar opposite of God's supreme passivity? On 
the analogy of immutability being the abstract pole of the 
divine mutability, the natural term would be impassability.
... But the polar opposite that is most frequently used is 
activity." (1)
Gunton goes on to claim that Hartshorne is uneasy and inconsistent, 
and reverses the logic of his own position when he writes:
"Contemporary theology ascribes to God, with full 
deliberateness, supreme sensitivity, that is passivity, not 
as contradictory of supreme activity, but as a necessary 
aspect of it." (2)
According to Gunton's argument:
"...this will not do. According to the logic of the 
position, it is passivity that is concrete and therefore 
ontologically prior, and activity that is an (abstract) 
aspect of it... This can only mean that the activity of God 
is abstract. The notion of abstract activity is a difficult 
one." (3)
The outcome of all this, claims Gunton, is that Hartshorne's God is no
(1) Gunton, C.E. Becoming and Being : The Doctrine of God in Charles 
Hartshorne and Karl Barth. p40
(2) Hartshorne, C. Man's Vision of God. p273 (hereafter referred 
to as M.V.G.)
(3) Gunton, C.E. Becoming and Being. p40
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better that the unmoved mover of classical theism. What Hartshorne 
arrives at is the moved unmover.
Gunton is not alone in his basic criticism, i.e. how are we to 
understand divine activity in Hartshorne’s theology?, but I find his 
formulation rather unsatisfactory. As far as I understand it, the 
dipolar concept of God is a way of positing both absolute and relative 
aspects of God. It is a way of ascribing both sides of the categoreal 
contrasts to the one entity, where these contrasts are otherwise 
mutually exclusive, e.g. necessary - contingent, abstract - concrete, 
infinite - finite, eternal - temporal. In other words the dipolar 
concept allows us to assert contradictory statements of the one God in 
two distinct respects. Now, the contrast which Gunton introduces, 
namely, passivity - activity is not a mutually exclusive contrast. 
One can be active and passive in the same respect at different times 
but one cannot be finite and infinite in the same respect at different 
times. The contrast of activity - passivity is a relative one. A 
person reading P.R. may be said to be physically passive but he is
certainly not mentally passive (at least not if he is reading
properly). A person watching a football match on Saturday afternoon 
may be said to be a passive spectator, but he is active in comparison
to the man who is asleep. Taken to the extreme it can be claimed that
there is no passivity in a concrete occasion because one is only truly 
passive in death. Therefore Gunton is wrong to claim that passivity 
must be concrete and activity abstract. There is no illogicality in 
saying that God is both active and passive in the same respect (after 
all human beings are both - concretely).
This does not resolve Hartshorne*s difficulties over divine activity. 
Lewis Ford criticises him by stating the problem thus;
71
"...it is difficult to understand the religious significance 
of divine action on Hartshorne’s view. God inspires our 
activities primarily by being the cosmic, all inclusive 
recipient of all our actions, preserving and enjoying them 
for evermore... The imposition of the laws of nature, [a 
fact which Hartshorne attributes to God] however, seems 
deficient in religious inspiration, even if it is God's 
primary mode of acting. While we may be comforted and 
reassured that God thereby protects us from chaos, this is 
primarily a matter for physics rather than for ethics and 
religion... There is no way to respond to a law of nature, 
particularly if imposed by God; it must simply be obeyed, 
willy nilly, for we have no choice in the matter." (1)
Hartshorne would obviously deny such criticisms and, I feel, rightly 
so. For Hartshorne God does lay down the laws of nature as parameters 
which limit the action of the created world, but he does not then 
retire to the wings and observe. God shares with all forms of life a 
social structure.
"No one has proved, or can possibly prove... that there is 
any 'matter' apart from social terms and relations. 
Electrons and protons are, for all that anyone knows, simply 
the lowest actual levels of social existence." (2)
Human nature then is just the highest created form of social 
interaction. Within the limits laid down by God in the laws of nature 
we react with each other and indeed with all classes of concrete 
objects. God too is part of this created world. He, however,
(1) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p79
(2) Hartshorne, C. P.R. p29
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is the eminent or perfect example of social interaction. Whereas man 
reacts imperfectly with some other people and some objects, God can 
react perfectly with all creatures. God influences and is influenced 
by every actual entity.
At this point it would useful to explain how the process analysis of 
reality into temporal quanta clarifies the idea of human relatedness. 
"Concretely I am a new reality each fraction of a second.
Each time I say ’I* the word refers to a new concrete 
reality. From a more or less abstract point of view the 
same reality, the very same person, is denoted: but is not 
all actual value in the concrete - the momentary states, 
rather than the ever identical person? If I, as I am now, 
feel a concern for myself as I may be a year from now, this 
is a kind of sympathy felt by one unit of actuality for 
potential future units belonging to the same personal 
series. But by very similar bonds of sympathy, I as I am 
now can feel a concern for potential future units belonging
to other personal series’," (1)
This makes perfect sense in process philosophy but for the absolute 
identity and absolute non-identity of substance philosophies it is 
nonsense. In this case love for others is love across a metaphysical 
gulf, for I simply am not you. Such absoluteness can make no sense of
the obvious similarités between self sympathy and sympathy for others,
"we have relative self identity and self love and similary 
relative non-identity and love of others. In some ways I am
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Process Philosophy as a Resource for Christian 
Thought’ in Lefevre, P. (ed) Philosophical Resources for 
Christian Thought. p56
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not myself two seconds running, and in some ways I am my 
neighbour. My recollections and his often largely overlap, 
our purposes, hopes and fears likewise: And as Royce so
eloquently argued, what is the self apart from its fund of 
recollections and its hopes, aims, and fear for the future?" (1) 
Within this continuous process of interaction, limited by the
parameters of the laws of nature, God acts upon actual entities as 
they act upon each other and in turn upon God. In the final analysis 
God's ultimate function is to enable each passing moment to have 
abiding significance, not because we will continue to look back and 
profit from it but because God will do so.
"In the long run - so I believe - we are nothing, except as 
God inherits reality and value from our lives and actions.
In ultimate perspective all life other than divine is purely 
contributory. We serve God is the last word, not, God 
serves us. And our reward? Our reward for serving God is 
simply that service itself. The essential reward of
virtue... is intrinsic and present." (2)
Thus there is, I believe, no real problem in Hartshorne's system about 
the activity of God. The problem remains one of distinguishing 
between God and the created realm and his answer to this has already 
been examined.
It remains, however, necessary to explain the difference in the method 
of God's activity between Whitehead and Hartshorne. The difference
(1) ibid. p56
(2) ibid. p52
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stems primarily from Hartshorne's denial of the existence of eternal 
objects. For Whitehead God acts by ordering the eternal objects and 
presenting each actual occasion with its possibilities for
actualisation. In Hartshorne's system God cannot do this but the 
created realm does have real creativity. For Hartshorne an actual
entity creates itself and does not merely choose between
possibilities. The real possibilities for each occasion are set by
its position in the spatiotemporal continuum, i.e. by the other 
entities it prehends. Thus an entity creates itself and therefore 
creates true novelty for God because the final actualisation of an 
entity is not a determinate possibility, even for God, before its 
concrete occurrence. Ultimately, however, for both men, it is through 
the idea of ’persuasion' that God acts. Hartshorne quotes Aristotle 
who wrote that the power of God over the world was that 'of the 
beloved over the lover'.
"What does this mean? A great scholar, Chung - Hwan Chen, 
interprets Aristotle as taking his cue from Plato's dialogue 
on love, according to which love seeks 'absolute beauty'. 
Generalising this for the universe, Aristotle is saying that 
it is by his supreme beauty that God moves or inspires the 
world. He charms it into trying to imitate, as best it can, 
his own excellence." (1)
Although in the final analysis both men conceive of God's activity in 
similar terms despite Hartshorne's denial of eternal objects, Neville 
believes that Hartshorne's system is seriously damaged by the total 
rejection of all Platonic theories of universels. Hartshorne, the 
Aristotelian, for whom C)A, believes that universals are preceded by
(1) ibid. p62
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and abstracted from past concrete actualities. Neville believes that 
this is to ignore the question of why certain forms of togetherness 
are coherent and others are not, why certain forms have great harmony' 
and others little or none.
"Unless this kind of question is addressed, the ontological 
structure of the world is taken for granted, not made 
intelligible." (i)
He goes on to say that although,
"...the question of how this or that form gets ingredient in 
the world is interesting, the more interesting question is 
what structure is, how it unifies multiplicity, how it 
stands related to chaos." (2)
Neville agrees with both Pierce and Whitehead that the only thing not 
requiring explanation is pure chaos. Although he does not agree with 
the explanations provided by either thinker, he believes that some 
attempt to account for the formal possibility of potentiality is 
necessary, and this Hartshorne cannot do.
I feel that Neville's criticism is based on a misunderstanding. 
Hartshorne does not need to account for the formal possibility of 
potentiality because potentiality is an inescapable fact of the 
'creative advance into novelty'. The world and God are in process and
the world and God must create, therefore, there is possibility and
potentiality. Within the constraining limits of natural laws the 
question of why certain forms have greater harmony than others is an
aesthetic question rather than an ontological one. It is wrong to see
(1) Neville, R.C. Creativity and God. p61
(2) ibid. p61
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harmony and togetherness as absolutes. If one studies the history of 
art one finds that harmony, completeness, or beauty are matters of 
aesthetic judgement which varies from individual to individual and 
from time to time. Neville is wrong, therefore, to link such
questions with the ontological structure of the world.
The bare minimum of structure is provided by the laws of nature and 
anything beyond this has been created, and could just as easily be 
destroyed, in the ongoing process. If freedom means anything then it 
means freedom to choose beauty, harmony, and togetherness or to reject 
them. If they are rejected continuously then the logical conclusion 
is chaos. Neville’s mistake, I believe, is that he does not see chaos 
as a real possibility. He wants an explanation, not for why we do not 
have chaos but, for why chaos is impossible and structure essential. 
For Hartshorne, I am sure, chaos is a distinct possibility which does 
not obtain largely to the'persuasion' of God and partly to the dim 
stumblings of the world as it attempts to live up to the vision of
God.
There are two other points of difference between Whitehead and
Hartshorne which require brief examination. The first is the
relationship between God and creativity. For Whitehead, as we have 
seen, God is not the ultimate metaphysical principle, this position 
belongs to creativity. This is not to say that creativity is a being 
beyond God, exercising power over him. To be sure, Whitehead does 
claim that
"...every actual entity, including God, is a creature
transcended by the creativity which it qualifies." (1)
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. pl22
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And also that both God and the world are In the grip of the creative 
advance towards novelty. But such statements must be interpreted in 
the light of Whitehead's ontological principle. We must not be put 
off by Whitehead's innovative language. Yes, he is going against 
tradition, but all he means by creativity is a description of reality 
- "the ongoingness of things'. This is ultimate and does qualify God 
in the sense that God is seen as always creating. As God he cannot 
cease to create something, but what is created is in no way determined 
by creativity.
Hartshorne seems to go against this position when he identifies God as 
the supreme abstract principle. In 'The Logic of Perfection...' he 
writes,
"If the supreme abstract principle were not uniquely divine, 
then God would either come under no concept and be 
inconceivable (and the word 'God* without meaning) or he 
would be but another instance of the principle, which would 
thus in a sense be super divine. This seems blasphemous". (1) 
Obviously Whitehead does not see God or the world as instances of 
creativity. Rather, creativity is a description, it is the universal 
of universals; characterising how,
"...the many which are the universe disjunctively, become 
the one actual occasion, which is the universe 
conjunctively.' (2)
(1) Hartshorne, C. The Logic of Perfection and other Essays in 
Neoclassical Metaphysics. p5
(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p28
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Hartshorne and Whitehead are not in disagreement here. For
Hartshorne, no less than Whitehead, creativity is a description 
applicable to the character of both God and the world. Neither man 
wishes to see God equated with creativity, or as the sole author of 
creation.
The final point of difference has to do with the being - becoming 
contrast which is of such importance for Tillich. Whitehead sees 
being as concrete and not solely as an abstraction from becoming. For 
Whitehead the process of becoming is not prehendable.
"In prehending all the being experienced in the occasion’s 
satisfaction, God 'loses nothing that can be saved'. What 
cannot be saved in divine consequent prehension is the 
occasions subjectivity inherent in its process of 
becoming... God prehends all occasions in their full 
immediacy of being, for there is no perishing of being in 
God insofar as this means 'the fading of immediacy as events 
cease to be present events'. But there is the perishing of 
becoming, which cannot be prehended by God because it is not 
prehendable." (1)
For Whitehead an entity's satisfaction is the same as its being. When 
an entity is complete it becomes a superject, an atomic creature, or a 
being. Hartshorne on the other hand, believes that the process of 
becoming just is the being of the entity. It is not a process of 
determination leading to static being. Ford correctly points out that 
the being which persists unchanged through a series of changes is 
abstract for both thinkers but the being of a single individual event
(1) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p73
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is, for Whitehead, concrete. Hartshorne’s becoming, which is the 
concreteness of successive occasions contrasted with elements of 
endurance, is Whitehead’s change. becoming, for Whitehead, is 
concrescence, it is neither concrete not abstract.
"To be sure (writes Ford) becoming includes being in the 
sense that each concrescing occasion prehends past being,
but it is also true that becoming is included in the being
into which it concresces. Becoming is the process of 
determination which terminates in determinate being, which
could not be what it is apart from such becoming." (1)
For both men the basic unit of reality is described as 'event' or
'feeling'. for Hartshorne this is an abstraction from the general,
concrete, process of becoming. For Whitehead, though, an event or
feeling is a concrete actuality which has become and which has
obtained objective immortality in God. Here we have the basic reason 
for this difference. For Whitehead the term 'becoming' applies to the 
individual entity. It becomes through a series of indeterminate 
phases culminating in the final determinate satisfaction. Hartshorne 
on the other hand, rejects any idea of genetic succession within an 
actual entity. For him an entity is internally single and coherent. 
Thus, for Whitehead, being is a concrete actuality contrasting with 
becoming and with nothing, it is what past occasions are and what 
present occasions become.
(1) ibid. p73-74
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CHAPTER THREE
Tillich and Process ; A possible dialogue?
The aim of this chapter is an examination of the areas of dialogue 
between Tillich and process, in order to highlight the major points of 
convergence and divergence. It is ny contention that while there may 
be remarkable similarities in system structure and in basic concepts 
there are also irreconcilable differences which prevent any kind of 
amalgamation. I will argue, both here and in chapter four, that the
two systems can best benefit from each other at isolated points. For *
example, process can be given more richness and depth by utilising the ITillichian insights into faith and the shock of non-being, and *■
'I
Tillich's vital but vague concept of participation can, in some cases, |
be clarified by Whitehead's concept of prehension.
On an initial glance the two systems would seem to be worlds apart;
Tillich, with his emphasis on the wholly transcendent God beyond God 
who cannot even be described as a^ 'being', and Whitehead whose God is
a being, himself in process as lover, orderer and lure. It does not 4
take too deep a probing, however, to reveal strong similarities in 
system structure and a mutual respect for each others viewpoint.
Hartshorne, for instance, describes Tillich as one of a -
"...tiny handful of sane men in a world wonderfully gone 
mad, intoxicated with the (very real) glory of empirical 
enquiry." (1)
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Non-Theological Meanings of 
Theological Terms'. Religion in Life, 35; p683
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It was John Lansing who noted that Tillich's basic ontological 
polarities of individualisation and participation, dynamics and form, 
and freedom and destiny are also present in Whitehead's metaphysics. 
Every actual entity involves both individualisation and participation. 
Although it is a process of becoming, each entity has a self identity 
constituted by its subjective aim. Each entity is also, however, 
constituted by its participation in the surrounding world. every 
actual entity is composed of individualisation, which, at each moment, 
is constituted teleologically and participation because every entity 
just its prehensions and relationships. The polarity of dynamics 
and form is also clearly present. Everything that 'is' has no 
alternative but to be involved in the dynamic process of becoming, but 
every occasion must function within the limits set for it by the 
principle of limitation. Lansing sees the polarity of dynamics and 
form as being represented in Whitehead by actual entities and eternal 
objects and while I do not disagree with this I think it is better 
represented by the metaphysical principles of 'creativity' and 'the 
principle of limitation'. Tillich's idea of destiny as the "given 
formed by nature, history and myself" which each of us must deal with, 
is paralleled in Whitehead's idea of a given, settled past forming the 
datum for each novel occasion. The freedom of an occasion is, for 
Whitehead, that it creates itself, it decides itself how it is to deal 
with its destiny; for Tillich freedom is deliberation, decision, and 
responsibility. The relationship of the two poles is also seen in 
similar ways by Whitehead and Tillich. Whitehead sees each actuality 
as creating a unity out of past multiplicity, which is then added into 
the multiplicity. Tillich relates freedom and destiny in the same way 
when he writes:
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"My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom 
participates in shaping my destiny." (1)
Tillich and process also agree on the inadequacy of classical theism. 
Tillich criticises theism for making God one being alongside others 
(Whitehead, though not Hartshorne, would share this criticism) while 
process criticises the classical concept of static perfectionism. 
Both Tillich and process, in their different ways, wish to maintain an 
infinite distinction between God and the creatures. Both maintain a 
sense of mystery; for Tillich this is the abysmal character of God, 
for process it is God's concrete character (namely, why he should be 
my God now). Most striking of all, however, is that Tillich, no less 
than process has a belief in the dynamic character of existence.
"... his (Tillich's) commitment to creativity and emergence 
in his ontological concept of life puts him in line with the 
evolutionary and organismic mode of thought characteristic 
of process philosophy." (2)
It is this rejection of the actus purus of classical theism which 
leads to both the strongest area of agreement and, at the same time, 
one of the greatest disagreements between Tillich and process. Both 
believe that God must contain the dynamic element of becoming, and 
this is perhaps their closest similarity; but they differ greatly in 
their elucidation of how God is related to becoming. Tillich insists 
that God must be described as 'being itself, though conceived in a 
non-static way and that 'becoming' on its own is an inadequate 
concept. Process, on the other hand, maintains that 'being', no
(1) Tillich, P. S^. I p204
(2) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. Theological 
Studies 36. p473
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matter how it is defined, must eventually and ultimately be conceived 
of as a static absolute.
This difference will be more fully elucidated later when it will also 
be argued that there are major disagreements, between Tillich and 
Hartshorne especially, over the nature of religious experience and the 
concept of God required by this experience. It must here be pointed 
out, however, that there are certain religious similarities between 
Tillich and Whitehead. Both men see God as transcending the threats 
and limitations of finitude or as providing the ground of finite 
existence. For Tillich, God is the ground or power of being, who 
preserves man out of non-being. For Whitehead, God preserves the 
being of man as it passes away into something else; it can never pass 
into total non-being but it must always decay, apart from its 
preservation in God. We saw in chapter two how Whitehead and 
Hartshorne use dipolarity to solve different problems within their 
concepts of God and this has consequences for their understanding of 
finitude. For Whitehead finitude, or temporality, is the state of 
being in process, of always being in transition into something else. 
Hartshorne would agree with this with the important addition that, for 
him, God too is essentially temporal. We can then see similarities 
between the ideas of temporality in Whitehead and Tillich. For the 
latter, temporality (he would prefer the term finitude) is a mixture 
of being and non-being, with God as the preserver of being; for the 
former, temporality can be described in Tillichian fashion as a 
mixture of being (or completion) and becoming with God as the 
preserver of being.
There are also parallels between Tillich's basic ontological structure 
of self-world and Whitehead's tripartite distinction between 'the
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whole, that other, and thie-my-self'. In Tillich the subject-object, 
or self world, structure is transcended by being itself or God, while 
in Whitehead the 'whole' transcends the other two elements and takes 
on a religious meaning in that the full value of something is its 
value for the totality. This similarity of basic system structure is 
all well and good and does provide us with a basis for dialogue and
perhaps the hope that some fruitful interaction may be possible; but
Tillich's being itself is not Whitehead's whole. Whitehead's whole is 
a mathematical totality of all that is, which transcends, contains and 
gives value to all individuals. The value of any individual lies in 
its contribution, however small, to the whole ; the individuals
constitute the whole. Tillich's being itself, on the other hand, 
transcends the self-world structure by not being part of it, by being 
beyond any such structures. In being itself there is no distinction 
between self and world or subject and object; as with the other 
ontological polarities the two poles are simply identical. Being 
itself is something other than a collection of beings, it preceded 
all individual beings and is in no way dependant upon them. For
Whitehead the totality exists, it has ontological reality, while for 
Tillich being itself is beyond existence and cannot be spoken of as ^  
being.
This in fact illustrates the principal and irreconcilable difference 
between the two systems, namely their conceptions of our knowledge of 
God. Both Tillich and process are concerned to do justice to the 
dynamic character of God, both reject the actus purus of the classical 
static absolute and both wish to apply the two sides of the categoreal 
contrasts to God. While process tackles the problems inherent in this 
through its dipolar concept of God and its insistence on the 
ontological superiority of becoming, Tillich uses his concept of
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religious symbolism. The dialogue between the two modes of thought 
has, at this point, been direct, and it is Hartshorne who has both 
welcomed Tillich’s rejection of classical ideas and criticised him for 
what he calls his "retreat behind the symbolic screen". (1)
Hartshorne sees this retreat as stemming from Tillich's failure to 
observe one of the prime rules of contemporary philosophizing, namely: 
"...do not use ordinary words with an extraordinary meaning 
without taking pains to understand the ordinary meaning and 
its relation to the proposed extraordinary one". (2)
For Hartshorne many statements about God are symbolic, for example, 
the biblical description of him as ruler, shepherd, father. These can 
be symbolic because they are specific images, and the fact that God is 
not literally a father opens up all sorts of possibilities having 
little, if anything, in common. Purely abstract terms, on the other 
hand, such as necessity, contingency, finity, infinity, absoluteness, 
relativity can have no useful symbolic meaning and can only be applied 
literally. These concepts may be asserted or denied of a particular 
thing in a particular aspect but there can be no third possibility. 
If a thing is not literally contingent then it is literally necessary; 
therefore, either God has contingent qualities in some respects or 
else all his qualities are necessary, it adds nothing to say that God 
is 'symbolically' contingent. This means, of course, that if our 
lives are intrinsic to the divine life, then either this much of that 
divine life is literally contingent or our lives are literally 
necessary.
(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p677
(2) ibid. p677
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"Spinoza's necessitarianism is literally right or its denial 
is literally right. What else can one intelligibly say." (1)
It was noted in chapter two that Hartshorne also introduces a third 
type of theological assertion when he explores the use of psychical 
terms in relation to deity. It is his contention that;
"there is a legitimate broadest possible meaning of 
psychical terms which is applicable to all individuals 
whatever, from atoms to deity". (2)
In this broadest meaning these terms become almost categorical, like 
relativity, but there remains an important difference; terms like 
'know* and 'love* can only apply to individuals whereas 'relative* or 
'absolute' can be applied to both individuals and abstractions. As a 
result of this greater abstractness of purely categorical terms their 
meaning does not vary from one level to another; to be contingent, 
that is to be constituted in some way by contingent relations, means 
simply and literally that. But to know, feel and love, here there are 
qualitative differences.
"A dog knows in doggish fashion, and God knows in divine 
fashion". (3)
Hartshorne prefers the term analogical to symbolic as a description of 
these terms and he sees the analogical extension of such concepts as a 
two way process. He does not believe that we take human concepts and
(1) ibid. p677
(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the other Great Tradition'. Anglican 
Theological Review 43 p253
(3) ibid. 254
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simply elevate them towards divinity but rather that our understanding 
of such concepts comes partly from religious experience, from some dim 
but direct awareness of deity.
"Brunner, I think, has suggested or implied that it is God
who is unqualifiedly personal, and human beings are only
imperfect, fragmentary pointers toward true personality". (1)
To 'know' ought to mean, having conclusive evidence and shutting off 
the very possibility of error, as God does, but to apply this idea to 
man we must tone it down. Similarly -
"It is God who loves - without any distorting antipathies or 
blind spots of mere indifference. God loves the creatures - 
period. We love a few creatures some of the time, and 
seldom or never wholly without complicating feelings of 
vanity, envy, irritation, fear and the like". (2)
I agree entirely with Hartshorne's criticism of Tillich's thorough 
going symbolism but I also believe that Tillich's description of
religion as the constant birth, growth and death of religious symbols
is well worth preserving; allowing, as it does, a measure of truth to
all religions - something Hartshorne and Whitehead would both agree
with. Thus, while Hartshorne does not deny symbolic language I feel 
he severely underestimates it. The term 'symbolic' must be maintained 
alongside 'analogical' because, as Tillich writes:
"... in symbolic, the symbol-creating and destroying 
activity of man's spiritual life is presupposed, while
analogy points to a static, calculable relation between the
(1) ibid. p254
(2) ibid. p255
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world and God". (1)
I do not think that Hartshorne would find this incompatible with his 
insistence that some terms must be applicable to God literally and 
some analogically; after all, the majority of our 'everyday' 
descriptions of God are undoubtably symbolic.
It is Hartshorne's dipolarity which enables him to escape from behind 
the 'screen of symbolism'. He sees no logical contradiction in a God 
who is universally independant, relative to nothing in one respect and 
yet dependant and relative in another. If we go from the ordinary to 
the extraordinary meanings of the terms dependant and independant then 
we see that while ordinary things are dependant or independant of some 
other things an extraordinary thing would be independant of, or 
dependant on, all other things. Hartshorne's God is both of these 
things, literally, in different respects.
"Universal relativity or dependence is just as extraordinary 
as universal absoluteness or independence. Who but God 
could be influenced not by some, but by all individuals? He 
and only he is aware of them all and loves them all". (2)
While Hartshorne and Tillich differ as to whether the categorical 
contrasts should be applied literally or symbolically to God they also 
disagree over the relationship of the polar opposites. Tillich treats 
the two sides of the categorical contrasts as being in symmetrical 
tension, in ordinary cases, while both are equally transcended in the
(1) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) Pholosophical Interrogations. p376
(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Non-Theological Meanings of 
Theological Terms'. p679
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case of God; whereas Hartshorne believes that one side of each
contrast 'overlaps' the other in both the ordinary and extraordinary 
uses. His argument is as follows;
"If A is in respect I independent of B and in respect R 
dependent upon B, then A as a whole, or in all aspects taken 
together as one entity, is dependent on B. Thus R, the
dependent aspect, is also the inclusive one, and I, the
independent aspect, is non-inclusive, is but a partial or 
abstract factor in A". (1)
Therefore the dependent or relative includes the independent or 
absolute, it is subjects which possess their objects, contingent 
things which have necessary aspects, actuality which includes an 
aspect of potentiality. This imbalance in the contrasts is, for
Hartshorne, fairly obvious but classical theism has for centuries 
attempted to invert it, has tried to subordinate the relative to the 
absolute, the contingent to the necessary, the temporal to the 
eternal, the subject to the object. From this it follows that, in the 
necessary-contingent contrast, the inclusive term is the contingent; 
and therefore, to identify God with 'necessary being* is to make him 
an extreme abstraction. God can be literally contingent as a whole 
and yet literally necessary in some abstract aspect. (2)
Here, I think, Hartshorne is mistaken. For example, in ordinary usage 
there are many levels of meaning in terms like dependent; some things 
we are dependant on for our fundamental character and outlook, while
(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit p679
(2) See Ralph James' description of Hartshorne's method as A)C 
outlined in chapter two.
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others may make a difference to us but are not so vital. If we follow 
Hartshorne's method and begin with the ordinary usage of the term 
dependence we can think of things upon which we depend. For example - 
oxygen; unfortunately we depend upon oxygen in all respects, there is 
no respect in which we are independent of it, so it is a poor example. 
Perhaps a personal illustration would serve better: I am in respect
of transport dependent upon my car but I am independent of it in most 
other respects. Without a car I would be fundamentally the same 
person, I would feel, think and act in basically the same ways, 
although certain routines, certain individual instances within my life 
would be different. Following Hartshorne's logic one should say that 
I am in all respects taken together dependent upon my car; but it 
seems unrealistic to me to say that my basic personality, which is 
independent of any car, is merely a partial or abstract factor in my 
whole being. This is obviously a very frivolous use of the term 
dependence but it is an accepted, common usage. A better example 
would perhaps be our dependence upon the media for news. We have all 
experienced the pleasure of ’escaping' from the media for a few weeks 
on holiday but is it really only the abstract, partial side of our 
being which takes such a holiday? Surely the aspects of our 
personalities which are independent of the media are as important and 
real, if not more so, than the aspects which are dependent. A final 
example of the 'equality' of the terms dependent and independent in 
ordinary usage is the human brain. The two sides of the brain are 
dependent on each other for perfect vision and total motor control but 
are independent in terms of such functions as speech. The dependent 
aspects of the two sides were only fully realised after several 
unfortunate patients had experienced the severing of their corpus 
callosum as a cure for epilepsy! but even so it seems ridiculous to
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describe either the dependent or independent aspects as mere 
abstractions. Surely the two sides of the dependence - independence 
contrast are in symmetrical tension in ordinary usage and so should 
also be in their extraordinary usage.
This is in line with Tillich's writing but when Tillich moves from the
ordinary to the extraordinary he completely changes meaning, as 
Hartshorne accuses him of, and describes being itself as the simple 
unity of such contrasts. I have to agree with Hartshorne that this is 
inadequate. To be superior to the tension between the poles through 
an infallible power to harmonise them is one thing; the mere identity 
of them, or sheer non-polarity is another. Hartshorne is correct in 
his assertion that -
"...the togetherness of being and becoming can be stated in 
such a way that God can be literally conditioned and still 
absolute". (1)
Hartshorne believes that through this identification of the polar 
opposites, and insistence on symbolic language, Tillich ultimately 
overwhelms the concept of becoming and remains tied to a classical 
philosophy of being. Hartshorne appeals to the nature of experience 
in his criticism of the term being itself. Being cannot be taken 
literally when our experience, itself a process, disclosed only 
processes and what can be abstracted from them.
"A 'being' which is not any process or any datum constituent 
of process cannot have literal meaning, for nothing of the 
sort appears in experience". (2)
(1) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. p476
(2) ibid. p480
92
As he says elsewhere :
"At best, 'being’ in this sense seems a reference to 
traditional metaphysics, by faith taken as a symbol of what 
no experience could exhibit". (1)
Tillich believed that many of the process criticisms of his work were 
but emphases on particular points and were not vital. He saw this 
problem of the ultimacy of being or becoming, however, as paramount 
and believed that anyone who has experienced the shock of non-being 
could make no concessions on the ultimacy of being.
Surely we can utilise the thought of both men here, and conceive of a
God who contains both sides of the categorical contrasts in perfect 
symmetrical tension. In this case we can describe the eternal, 
absolute, immutable aspect of deity as 'being itself and the 
concrete, relative, finite aspect as 'becoming'. This overcomes the 
criticism of Hartshorne's position, that he ultimately has a finite 
God, and, at the same time, preserves the dipolarity of deity. We are 
at this point, however, faced with a dilemma; we cannot really combine 
Tillich with Hartshorne, we must eventually choose between them. On 
the description of God as including both being itself and becoming we 
are not being true to Tillich unless we allow being itself to overcome
absolute non-being, and this would be to diverge from Hartshorne.
The dilemma then is whether we steer closer to Tillich, and allow the 
existence of non-being, thus denying the necessity of some contingent 
thing, or whether we steer towards Hartshorne and deny the existence 
of non-being thus robbing being itself of its Tillichian character. It 
is, unfortunately, true that we cannot unite the two systems at this
(1) Kegley, C.W. and Bretall, R.W. (eds) The Theology of Paul 
Tillich. pl95
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point, although, I believe, process certainly can still benefit from 
the dialogue, as shown above.
Tyron Inbody has isolated three reasons for Tillich's rejection of 
becoming as the metaphysical absolute; logical, phenomenological and 
religious. Firstly, being is logically superior to becoming because, 
while becoming overcomes relative non-being (me on), only being itself 
can negate absolute non-being (ouk on). Furthermore, anything
particular can be denied but you cannot deny being, because even such
negative judgements are acts of being and are only possible though 
being. For Tillich, to say that being is, means that it is the
negation of possible non-being; "is means 'is not not'" (1).
Secondly, Tillich criticises becoming on phenomenological grounds for 
ignoring the primordial intuition of all being and knowing.
"Man as an existing and knowing being experiences the power 
of being at the depth of his own being and knowing". (2)
While process thought denies any such intuition Tillich sees it as 
obvious to a reflective person. Finally, Tillich rejects becoming as 
ontologically absolute in order to preserve the holiness of God.
While Tillich defends the idea of dynamic elements within the being of 
God he rejects any notion of a becoming God, and maintains that any
reference to God as finite must be symbolic.
"I cannot accept... [Hartshorne's] assertion that the
elements which characterise finite being can be applied to 
God 'literally', because that would make God finite; and a 
'finite God' is a contradiction in terms. Certainly, one
(1) Tillich, P. My Search for Absolutes. p81
(2) Inbody, T. op. cit. p482
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must say that God has the finite... 'within' himself, not 
alongside himself - which would also make him finite. But 
he is not subject to finitude; he is the infinite who 
comprises his infinity and his finitude. If this is denied 
he becomes another name for the process of life, seen as a 
whole, and is subject to the tragic possibility which 
threatens every finite process. Then not only is the world 
a risk taken by God, but God himself is a risk to himself, a 
risk which may fail". (1)
Tillich attempted to reduce this being - becoming disagreement to mere 
verbal status by asking the process thinker to accept the power of 
non-being.
"If being means static self identity, becoming must be the 
ultimate principle. But if being means the power that 
conquers non-being... then even the process philosopher must 
acknowledge that being, namely, the negation of non-being, 
precedes in ontological dignity the polarity of the static 
and the dynamic". (2)
There are two basic disagreements here, one is a philosophical 
disagreement over the existence of non-being and the other is a 
religious disagreement about the concept of God required by religious 
experience. The primary reason for Tillich's insistence on the 
supremacy of being over becoming is his belief in the ontological 
threat of non-being which for process thought is an absurdity. For 
process philosophy 'being' is a wholly non-restrictive term and is,
(1) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) op. clt. p376
(2) ibid. p377
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therefore, necessary. Being as such, namely God and some world or 
other (it doesn't matter what world) are necessary, they must exist.
Two important consequences, for our purposes, follow from this.
Firstly, the traditional Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is 
denied. God and the world are co-eternal, they both exist because 
they logically must exist, therefore, God, like man, creates from 
previously existent actuality, including himself. For Hartshorne,
God's creativity must be analogous to man’s otherwise it could have no 
meaning. This is obvious given what we already know of Hartshorne's 
theory of analogy but it is directly opposed to Tillich who sees 
creatio ex nihilo as the decisive Christian doctrine. The second Iconsequence of the necessity of being is that any concept of non-being f
or absolute nothingness becomes absurd and meaningless. As Hartshorne 
claims, contingency is not the possibility of something or nothing but 
the indeterminacy of which 'somethings' will exist.
"Contingency just is the freedom of creativity as between 
positive options". (1)
This, of course, is alien to Tillich who holds that all finitude is a 
mixture of being and non-being with God, as the power of being, 
supporting all creatures out of non-being. It is only through or 
because of God that the finite world survives against the threat of 
non-being. Here we can see two different answers to Parmenides' 
ancient question ; 'Why is there something, why not nothing?', 
Tillich answers by claiming that God is the ground of the world, in 
the sense that, as the power of being, he is the presupposition of any 
world at all. While Hartshorne would not disagree with this he would
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Could There Have Been Nothing? : A Reply'
Process Studies 1. p28
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have to add that some world is also a presupposition of God. 
Hartshorne’s answer to Parmenides is that there must be something; it 
is necessary that both perfection (God) and some (any) contingent 
thing exists. It is not only their answers to this question which are 
different but the appreciation of the question itself. Tillich sees 
the question as being essentially religious, he shares J.J.C. Smart’s 
outlook:
"that anything should exist at all does seem to me a matter 
for the deepest awe". (1)
It is, for Tillich, while we are confronted with this awe-full 
question that we come to an awareness of the necessity of being 
itself. For Hartshorne, on the other hand, the question of why 
anything should exist is logically meaningless and of no religious 
value at all.
A careful defence of non-being against Hartshorne comes from Houston 
Craighead who attempts to show that because non-being is a logical 
possibility Hartshorne’s ontological argument is based on false 
assumptions. Craighead outlines six arguments in Hartshorne’s 
writings for the impossibility of there being no concrete things at 
all.
(a) Fistly, that absolute nothingness is absolutely unknowable. 
Craighead accuses Hartshorne of winning the game by defining the real 
in terms of the knowable. He claims that Hartshorne redefines God’s 
perfect knowledge in order to suit his ideas. Perfect knowledge means 
knowledge of all possible states but not knowledge of the future as
(1) Smart, J.J.C. ’The Existence of Cod’; New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology; ed. Flew, and McIntyre p46
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this would deny real freedom. Craighead claims that if Hartshorne can 
define perfect knowledge however he wants to, then so can he and 
proceeds to define it as knowledge of all possible positive states. 
This, of course, means that the one possible negative state, total 
nothingness, is, therefore, unknowable to God and not contradictory of 
the idea of a perfect knower.
"What I am saying is this: If Hartshorne can redefine the
notion of perfect knowledge in order to retain both that 
notion and another notion, freedom, then I can also redefine 
perfect knowledge to keep both it and a notion I claim is 
meaningful, the possibility that there might have been (and 
yet might be) nothing at all". (1)
I find this extremely unsatisfactory as a definition of perfect 
knowledge. The Oxford dictionary defines the term "perfect" as being 
"complete, not deficient, faultless"; well surely this must mean, if 
it means anything at all, that perfect knowledge includes knowledge of 
all possible states and to insist that there is an unknowable 
possibility is to deny that perfect knowledge could exist at all. 
There is a great difference between Hartshorne's concept of perfect 
knowledge as complete knowledge of all possibility (which is surely 
not limiting perfect knowledge) and Craighead's concept of a perfect 
knowledge which is limited as to what possibilities it may know. It 
is not only the concept of human freedom which makes Hartshorne 
correct in asserting that God cannot know the future. God 'knowing' 
the future could only be achieved if the future were already a part of 
God's present, in which case the very idea of future (as anything
(1) Craighead, H. 'Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God' 
Process Studies 1 pl6
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other than a relative, purely human concept) is denied.
(b) Craighead dismisses this argument, that 'every statement must 
contain something positive, therefore, the statement nothing exists is 
necessarily false', as, once again, a case of definition of words.
(c) This argument is that God himself insures the existence of some 
world. For Craighead this is an explicit contradiction of 
Hartshorne's denial of creatio ex nihilo. He accuses Hartshorne of 
committing a petitio:
"God exists necessarily if at least some concretum exists 
necessarily, and some concretum exists necessarily because 
God's power insures it". (1)
This is a misunderstanding of Hartshorne however, who is not claiming 
that God insures the world out of nothingness. God is 'being 
itself in the sense that what things are for him is identical 
with what they really are.
"Thus to be is to be for God, to fail to be is to fail to be 
for God. He is the definitive reality, the measure of all 
truth". (2)
Hartshorne is not using the idea of God to maintain a world out of 
non-being as Craighead claims.
(d) The fourth argument is called, by Craighead, 'psychological' and, 
by Hartshorne, pragmatic. It is that any belief which cannot be 
expressed in action is merely verbal and therefore unreal. Hartshorne 
claims no one can really doubt, except in words the inevitable
(1) ibid. pl7
(2) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p27
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existence of some concrete thing while Craighead argues that there are 
many who infact do.
(e) This argument, as outlined by Craighead, is that; the fact that 
the statement 'some concretum necessarily exists' is not contradictory 
proves that it is also true. Craighead argues that the non-
contradictory nature of the statement does not make it true unless it
is first shown that the existence of some universe is a question of 
necessity. Craighead again appeals to what we can or cannot conceive 
and claims that Hartshorne has not yet proved that we cannot conceive 
of nothingness.
(f) The final argument, principally elucidated by William Reese, is 
that all our negative statements can be handled on a model of
'othering' and that we never refer in ordinary language to non-being. 
Reese notes two kinds of denial; predicate denial and subject denial. 
In the case of predicate denial the predicate in question can always 
be replaced by something else, for example, "Socrates is not ill" can 
be replaced by "Socrates well"; the 'not' does not refer in any way 
to non-being. In the case of subject denial things are more
complicated, for example, "Socrates does not exist".
"A denial in the subject means that one has a 'mental 
construct' which has no counterpart in the 'outer' world; 
one has an idea of Socrates but fails to be able to match it 
with anything 'outside'. The reference, thus, is not to 
non-being but to the fact that Socrates has only mental 
existence". (1)
Craighead has two criticisms of this argument; firstly, that in
(1) Craighead, H. op. cit. pl9
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subject denial we do not replace what is denied by anything else. 
"Socrates exists’ really means 'Socrates has both physical 
and mental existence'. The denial of physical existence, 
therefore, is not to replace it with something... but to 
deny it altogether. Is this not a reference to non-being?" (1) 
Secondly, Craighead argues that ordinary usage is not an adequate 
criterion for philosophical concepts and so lack of reference to non- 
being in ordinary language does not prove its non-existence.
Craighead believes that Hartshorne's arguments fail to prove the 
impossibility of non-being; he further believes that such a proof is 
impossible because it can be shown that it is logically possible for 
there to be no concretum at all. He advances two arguments for this
belief; in the first place there is a sense of wonder and awe that
anything should exist at all and here he cites Smart, Huxley,
Heidegger and others as evidence of this; secondly, that we can
conceive of there being nothing at all. The force of the first 
argument is that necessarily existent things do not generate a sense 
of awe, therefore, the existence of anything must be contingent. I
would seriously question, however, whether the sense of wonder and awe
testified to by Craighead's list of philosophers was not a sense of
wonder at the existence of some particular thing within our world as
we know it, rather than wonder that anything whatsoever should exist. 
The second of Craighead's arguments is interested purely in logical 
possibility; Craighead believes that we can conceive of total non- 
being, therefore, it is a possibility. Hartshorne would not deny the
(1) ibid. pl9
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force of this argument but he would disagree that we can conceive of 
non-being.
Here we can see the problem with the dialogue between Hartshorne and 
Craighead on this point; it ultimately boils down to personal belief 
and intuition. Craighead argues that he can conceive of total non- 
being and Hartshorne replies that Craighead thinks he can conceive of 
non-being. Both men throw lists of supporting thinkers at each other 
and both appeal to intuition, ultimately trusting their own intuition 
for the final answer. As Hartshorne so illuminatingly writes;
"...if I have not proved the impossibility of an unknowable, 
neither has he [Craighead] proved its possibility. And all
proof rests on intuition somewhere. For me the proof on my
side is strong." (1)
While the existence, or otherwise, of non-being as a possibility must 
remain, for the moment then, a logical imponderable, it seems to me
that, if God is necessarily existent (which he must be inorder to be 
worthy of worship and fulfil traditional ideas), we can outline three 
possible options;
(a) Agreement with process that God is a being, therefore, being (in 
terms of perfection and some concretum) is necessary and non-being 
meaningless.
(b) Agreement with Tillich that God is not a being, therefore, being 
is not necessarily existent and non-being is a perfectly meaningful, 
ontological, possibility.
(c) One could, of course, deny the existence of God. Tillich, 
Whitehead and Hartshorne would all reject this third option although
(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p27
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only Tillich would deny it as a possibility. For Tillich it is not 
possible that God does not exist because non-being requires being 
itself as its negation, the existence of finitude implies the 
existence of both non-being and being itself. Hartshorne and 
Whitehead would not deny that atheism is a formal possibility but they 
reject it, along with classical theism, as an imperfect description of 
reality. For them the truth lies in a higher synthesis of the 
categorical contrasts, namely, a God who is Absolute and Relative.
If we then discard the third option we are left with what appears to 
be a straight choice, although I would suggest that a fourth option 
which maintains the truth of both positions is possible. I would like 
to preserve the idea of God as a necessary being, and so avoid
Tillich’s difficulties of speaking of God as not existing, and yet to 
continue to affirm the possibility, or rather the actuality, of the 
threat of non-being. In this case, of course, absolute non-being is 
meaningless but each individual or individually ordered series of
actual occasions is open to the possibility of non-being and is,
therefore, open to Tillich’s ’ontological shock*. If this is accepted 
then the much used example of process critics, that people feel awe at 
the existence of anything can be, more truthfully, expressed as a 
feeling of awe that they personally should exist or that some
particular beautiful thing should exist. Although Hartshorne, in
particular, has no need of such a feeling of awe it is not
incompatible with his system. He does not share, as Tillich does, 
Otto’s description of holiness as a numinous experience but rather 
describes it as "motivational adequacy". Hartshorne holds that, in 
God, virtue and knowledge are identical;
"If, then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as
actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate
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motivation for seeking to actualise maximal possibilities of 
further value... The holiness of God consists... in the 
single aim at the one primary goal, which is that the 
creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living and pour 
this richness into ... the life of God". (1)
There is nothing here which would disallow such feelings of awe at the 
existence of something although Hartshorne may see them as rather 
unnecessary.
What we are aiming at then is an amalgamation of Tillich’s ’shock of 
non-being’ with a process concept of God. Tillich’s language of 
participation and the idea that a finite being participates in both 
being and non-being is not necessary for the idea of the ’shock of 
non-being’. All that this requires is that non-being is a possibility 
for the individual, not just a logical possibility but a real and 
threatening one. These conditions are fully met in the real world and 
can be incorporated into Whitehead’s system (as was seen at the 
beginning of this chapter Hartshorne is not as useful here). The 
shock of non-being, for Tillich, is answered by faith in God who, as 
the ground of being, supports us against non-being. In Whitehead 
completion, or being, is the final determination of an actual entity 
which is preserved in God. God acts as the preserver of being, making 
sure that nothing is lost, nothing disappears into the abyss of non- 
being. Whitehead may not be using non-being in a Tillichian sense 
here but both men use the term non-being to describe a kind of 
nothingness or emptiness and it is, more than anything else, a shock 
of ’nothingness’ which Tillich is describing. It may be argued that
(1) Hartshorne, C. The Divine Relativity, pp 124-128
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in the above analysis the threat of non-being is not a real threat
because (a) God necessarily exists, and (b) God preserves all being, 
therefore, all being is necessarily preserved. However, in Tillich's 
thought, the threat of non-being is counteracted by faith and 
ultimately, I believe, faith is all we have to 'prove' the necessary 
existence of God. Therefore, without faith there is no necessarily 
existent God, no preserver of being, and the threat of non-being 
remains as, at least, a possibility dependant upon faith; which is all 
Tillich's concept demands.
We saw earlier that the being - becoming debate between Tillich and
process included two basic disagreements. Firstly, the philosophical 
argument over the existence of non-being, examined above, and 
secondly, the religious argument over the kind of God required by 
experience. For Hartshorne the religious concern is a total, 
unreserved concern about the supreme person not an ultimate concern 
about the ultimate; For Tillich on the other hand, authentic religious 
experience is the primordial intuition of being itself at the ground 
of all being and knowing; it is an awe-full experience based on the 
shock of non-being. For Hartshorne there is no primordial intuition 
as such, although there is an intuitive element in interpreting 
experience; the primary experience is that of the self as becoming in 
a world of becoming, anything 'beyond' this is an abstraction from the 
process. Hartshorne can then claim that the God of classical theism 
is not required by our religious experience; all that is required is 
an object adequate to justify unreserved love, and thus a God who is
in some respects conditioned could still be worthy of worship. This
means that the categorical contrasts do not have to be interpreted 
exclusively, as in, what Hartshorne calls, the 'negative theology of 
the great tradition'. Hartshorne's finite-infinite individual is, for
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him, perfectly acceptable to religious experience.
"Between the finite-infinite individual and the merely
finite individuals there is a gap in natures which is 
literally infinite.... The real trouble is... the idolatry
of infinity, being, cause, and absoluteness, accepted as
substitutes for the divine unity of the contraries, finite- 
infinite, being-creativity, cause-effect, absolute-
relational, being as such and a_ being". (I)
Hartshorne would be wrong totally to dismiss Tillich’s description of 
faith as ultimate concern, however, as the description of an inner 
tension between concreteness and ultimacy, included in this, can be 
used by process to provide a phenomenological basis for its 
dipolarity. Although neither Whitehead nor Hartshorne have shown much 
interest in a description of ’faith', they could benefit greatly from 
Tillich’s phenomenological insight. For Tillich, faith can only be 
truly directed towards the ultimate but as we have no direct access to 
ultimacy we must use a mediating concrete concern (the Tillichian 
Symbol). Because process sees God as both concrete and ultimate, with 
his concrete nature being the summation of reality, it can easily take 
on board Tillich's description. Also worth preserving is Tillich's 
realisation that while any concrete concern has the potential to 
mediate ultimacy only a true symbol does so truly. Hartshorne, with 
his insistence that any assertion whatever is in some way an assertion 
about God, and his restriction of symbolism, is in danger of missing 
this insight. Tillich is right to insist that the risk of faith lies 
in never being certain whether one's symbols, one's concrete concerns,
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Other Great Tradition'. p259
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are infact true symbols for the ultimate God.
This same religious disagreement is at the root of the argument over 
whether God is being or not. For Tillich he cannot be without 
losing his total transcendence and becoming finite, therefore, under
the threat of non-being. For Hartshorne God does not need to be
totally ’other’, he is a being among beings albeit the perfect being. 
We must remember here that Whitehead’s God is more transcendent than 
Hartshorne’s, therefore, closer to Tillich's and less open to the 
criticisms of religious inadequacy which have been levelled at 
Hartshorne. If Hartshorne's were the only process conception of God 
then it would be worth while to attempt to use Tillich's emphasis on 
transcendence to modify Hartshorne's primarily immanent God. However, 
as Whitehead's God does not suffer from this potential problem I 
believe this is unnecessary.
Also involved in this dispute over religious experience is the 
question of God’s freedom, that is his autonomy and power to ground a 
world. The question is whether God's freedom is dependant upon a 
doctrine of external relations and so necessitating the idea of aseity 
or whether such freedom can be defined and defended within a doctrine 
of internal relations. External relations are those which are totally 
non-constitutive of an event or persons being, whereas internal
relations are so constitutive. Process philosophy, through 
Whitehead's concept of prehension, can allow and explain the existence 
of both types of relation. God, at any particular time, is internally 
related to all past actuality because of his prehension of this
actuality, but he is externally related to all future actuality 
because he (as he is at this particular moment) does not prehend such
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actuality (1). Obviously it is internal relations, for process, 
which are most important and distinctive about the concept of God.
Tillich agrees that on a doctrine of internal relations God may be 
absolutely free or independent in his existence as such; but, he
claims God cannot be adequately free, that is, free in the sense of
being the autonomous ground of the world system, a source not 
dependent, in any way, upon the actuality of the world. For Tillich,
Hartshorne's idea of God as independent of the actuality of any 
particular world but dependent on the existence of some world or other 
is religiously inadequate. Hartshorne, though, does not need a God 
who can ground the world in a Tillichian sense; God is the ground of 
the world in that he gives it value and meaning, and for this he does 
not need the classical attribute of aseity. Inbody rather nicely sums 
up the basic religious difference between process and Tillich when he 
asks which is the most intolerable situation:
"... denying that God is a being, and so not being able to 
apply directly any predicates to God, or making literal 
statements about God as a being, but not being able to 
distinguish absolutely God from all other actual beings"? (2)
It is interesting to note that John Lansing, when comparing Tillich 
and Whitehead, concluded that the basic difference between them was 
philosophical, '
(1) Note the difference here between Whitehead and Hartshorne.
Whitehead sees God as a single actual entity whereas, for
Hartshorne, he is a society of entities.
(2) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. p492
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"Whitehead's God answers the same religious question and 
performs the same religious function as does Tillich's 
God... The difference roots, I believe, in their differing 
understandings of the metaphysical ultimate". (1)
Whereas Tyron Inbody concluded that the difference between process and 
Tillich was basically religious.
"The fundamental difference between Paul Tillich and the 
process theologians, then, is a religious difference". (2)
While I believe that both Lansing and Inbody have hit on crucial 
differences between Tillich and process I would contend that neither 
has put forward the basic reason for these differences. It is too 
glib to label the differences between the two systems as 'religious' 
or 'philosophical' and then claim that if this basic difference could 
be overcome then process and Tillich could be brought closer together. 
The differences between Tillich and process rest ultimately on 
Tillich’s systematic structure and you cannot 'tinker' with elements
of the system without affecting the whole. Tillich himself described
systematic thought as:
"...the unity in which every statement is under the critical
control of every other statement". (3)
Beginning with his method of correlation and using tremendous 
religious, psychological and phenomenological insights Tillich
(1) Lansing, J.W. 'A Philosopher and a Theologian compared : Tillich 
and Whitehead on God'. A.A.R, Philosophy of Religion and 
Theology Proceedings. pl02
(2) Inbody, T. op. cit. p490
(3) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) Philosophical Interrogations. p409
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produced a system which, in terms of its concept of God, lies 
somewhere between classical theism and process dipolarity. Separating 
him from classical ideas is his insistence on a dynamic God, his 
rejection of the actus purus; and separating him from process 
dipolarity is his concept of non-being and his insistence on
symbolism. It is, I believe, the latter which is crucial; because if
we remove from Tillich's system the concept of symbolic language,
which process demands, and apply the categorical polarities literally 
to God then Tillich is faced with a decision. He would be forced to 
either return to classical theism and apply only one side of the 
contrasts to God or he would have to follow through his convictions 
and become a dipolar theist proper; either way Tillich's unique system 
would be destroyed. When I began this research I was hoping for some 
kind of amalgamation of Tillich with process but as I started to 
realise that this was an impossibility I became appreciative of this 
very fact. Whatever the merits or demerits of the two ways of
thinking theology is richer for possessing them both, and a straight
forward union of the two could be true to neither tradition. Truth 
(whatever that word may mean) can only come through dialogue within 
multiplicity and diversity; and through dialogue between process and 
Tillich, I believe, concepts on both sides can be given greater
clarity and strength. For example, in this chapter I have shown how
Tillich’s phenomenological insight into the threat of non-being can be 
included within process and in the next chapter I will attempt to 
clarify Tillich's concept of participation by using Whitehead's
prehension.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Participation and Prehension ; Some Clarifications
It is my contention in this chapter that Tillich’s fundamentally 
important concept of participation can, in some of its uses, be given 
much needed clarity through reference to Whitehead’s concept of 
prehension. The chapter begins with an analysis of prehension 
followed by a careful study of participation and its numerous uses and 
concludes with an elucidation of how, in my opinion, the one can 
benefit the other.
I Prehension
According to Whitehead the term ’prehension’ is used to express; 
"...the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own 
concretion of other things." (1)
The concept is uniquely Whiteheadian and is seen by Hartshorne among 
others, as Whitehead's most important contribution.
"In a single conception it explains the spatiotemporal
structure of the world, the possibility of knowledge, and
the reality of freedom. It is, in my opinion, one of the 
supreme intellectual discoveries." (2)
Whitehead coined the term prehension, by dropping the first syllable 
from the word apprehension, in order to have a more neutral term to 
express the Lockian ideas of 'understanding' and 'perception'. He was
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p71
(2) Hartshorne, C. Whiteheads Philosophy. pl27
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concerned to explain the notions of causality and relation which, 
while important in any philosophy, are vital in a philosophy of 
organism. Change, for such a philosophy, is a succession of 
distinguishable, momentary states rather than the variation of an 
individual with time. Causality, then, is the universal relation to 
the past not simple, individual identity.
"Reality consists, for precise analysis, of successions of 
states or events causally related to predecessors, only some 
of which were in the same individual series. Causality is 
not stopped at the boundaries of so called identity. In a 
special limited form causality is that entity... In short, 
within a person's body and mind, or psychophysical system, 
and between it and the rest of the world, there are many 
intersecting causal lines." (1)
Using the 'principle of reasonable anthropomorphism' we can 
investigate this causal relation through analogy with elements of our 
own experience. Within experience we find two clues to causality. 
These are;
(a) Memory - in memory, past experience (even if only immediately 
past) influences present experiences.
(b) Perception - when we perceive an event outside of the body it has 
already happened, it takes time for stimuli to reach the body and for 
perception to take place, therefore, we are being influenced by the 
past. The same can be argued for events perceived from inside the 
body; it is only an unproven and questionable hypothesis that our
(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of 
Prehension' p.30
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perceptual experience is simultaneous with the bodily events 
perceived. It can, therefore, be seen that memory and perception both 
involve only past conditions, both share a common structure and, thus, 
Whitehead can affirm an analogy between human, personal experiences 
and non-human, non-personal ones.
Prehension, however is not simply a mere having of data; in every 
experience (although negligibly so on the lowest levels of nature) 
there is at least something like imagination and inference. Each
entity responds to signs which are prehended in the ordinary
perceptual way; on the higher levels of reality this sign usage
becomes Whitehead's 'symbolic reference’.
"We interpret, verbalise, theorise, make more or less 
'educated* guesses about what is experienced. This is the 
how of experience rather than its what. In later memories 
the how can become a what, that is, itself experienced. 
Introspection is a reality in this sense. Self Awareness is 
not, for Whitehead, simultaneous prehension." (1)
Whitehead delineates two types of prehension; 'physical' prehensions 
are those whose data consists of past actual entities, while
'conceptual' prehensions are those which prehend eternal objects.
Neither type of prehension necessarily involves consciousness in its 
subjective form and both are analysable in the same way. Prehensions 
are one of the eight categories of existence and are described as the: 
"Concrete facts of relatedness".(2)
(1) ibid. p32
(2) ibid. p34
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In Whitehead’s twenty seven categories af explanation (1) we learn 
that, in its most concrete elements, an actual entity is a 
concrescence of prehensions which have originated in its process of 
becoming. Any further analysis of an entity, therefore, is, infact,
analysis of prehensions and this Whitehead calls 'division*.
Prehensions can be analysed as containing three factors:
"(a) the 'subject' which is prehending, namely the actual 
entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) 
the 'datum' which is prehended; (c) the 'subjective form' 
which is how that subject prehends that datum". (2)
Later, Whitehead describes 'positive' prehensions or 'feelings' as 
analysable into five factors, which are:
"(i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial data' 
which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of 
negative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum' which is 
felt, (v) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject
feels that objective datum" (3)
Positive and negative prehensions are called, by Whitehead, two 
species of prehensions; one termed 'feelings' while the other is said 
to 'eliminate from feeling'.
"Negative prehensions also have subjective form. A negative 
prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive 
concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the 
subject". (4)
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p30-35
(2) ibid. p31
(3) ibid. p312
(4) ibid. p32
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The analysis in terms of prehensions is called division because it is 
a case of abstracting from a unity; all the elements of a prehension 
being mutually determined.
"there is a concrescence of the initial data into the 
objective datum, made possible by the elimination, and 
effected by the subjective form... The subjective form
receives its determination from the negative prehensions,
the objective datum and the conceptual origination ... The 
negative prehensions are determined by the ... subjective
form and by the initial data." (1)
Hartshorne, because of his rejection of eternal objects, is obviously 
going to have to take issue with Whitehead over the subject of
conceptual or mental prehensions. For Hartshorne the mental
prehensions can be included within physical prehensions if the latter 
is taken as including:
"(a) at least a minimal sense of futurity and (b) at least a 
minimal sense of contrast, likeness and difference among the 
past data prehended." (2)
Futurity he defines as Aristotle's 'potentiality' or Epicurus' 
'mixture of chance and necessity' where:
"The necessity is that the experience must somehow become
datum for some further experiencing; the chance, ... is the
freedom or indeterminacy as to just how or in just what 
further experiences this status as datum may be brought 
about." (3)
(1) ibid. p312
(2) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p32
(3) ibid p.32
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This difference, however, is only important for a comparison of 
Whitehead and Hartshorne and is irrelevant for our purposes as it does 
not affect the theory of prehension or its usefulness for 
clarification of Tillich. (1)
Whitehead’s theory can explain both the freedom and determination of 
causality. Each datum is a necessary condition for an experience but 
not even all the data taken together could constitute a sufficient 
reason for a particular experience. Together the conditions make the 
experience possible but they are insufficient to make it causally 
necessary or, in its concrete singularity, predictable.
"Causes make what happens more or less probable, they do not 
necessitate it ... This is the freedom or creativity of all 
experiencing. It is not intelligible that a multiplicity 
could dictate, completely determine, a particular addition 
to that multiplicity," (2)
The theory also allows for both internal and external relations and 
causal connectedness. There are internal relations of events because, 
in so far as events prehend others, they are constituted by their 
relations to these others. There are external relations of events 
because an event prehended by a subsequent event cannot in any way be 
constituted by that event. Finally there is causal connectedness 
because, the occurrence of an event strictly entails that of those 
events which it prehends, and also, as process is bound to go on, 
subsequent events must be sufficiently alike their predecessors to be
(1) For the other consequences of Hartshorne's denial of eternal 
objects refer to chapter two.
(2) Hartshorne, C. Whitehead’s Philosophy. pl26
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able to prehend or objectify them. The necessary ongoingness of the
creative process is affirmed for two reasons; firstly, to be present
is to be destined to become past and secondly, for Whitehead, to be
past is identical with being a datum for some future subject. Hence
it is essential for an event to be prehended by some subject although 
what subject is immaterial.
"Not only does the present prehending subject require a 
certain past, but that past required, not indeed this 
particular subject, but still, some suitable subject or 
subjects capable of prehending that particular past." (1)
This, of course, requires that the past be indestructible, it cannot 
be dismissed as unreal and so incapable of influencing the present. 
This I take to be self evident otherwise our history, science, art 
all become nonsense, how can they make sense if historical events are 
unreal or mere fancies? For Whitehead the past 'perishes* and becomes 
objectified by the present and in this way all entities have 
immortality. In the normal process of becoming such objective
immortality loses the vividness of the past but in God this
objectification is uniquely perfect and complete.
II Participation
Participation is used by Tillich very much as an 'umbrella' concept 
and it appears throughout his system with an apparent plethora of
meanings. the following analysis is based on a study of all the
references to participation found in the three volumes of Systematic 
Theology. Tillich's other writings were not included here for two
(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p29
117
reasons; firstly, the pragmatic limitation of time and secondly, I do 
not believe that there are any significant Tillichian meanings of the 
term participation not covered within Systematic Theology.
Although Tillich never provides us with a careful definition of what 
he means by participation it is possible to distinguish, within his 
writings, three primary uses.
1. Participation within the realm of existence; i.e. beings 
participating with one another,
2. Participation between the realms of existence and essence; beings 
participate with their perfect essences from which they are
alienated.
3. Participation between existence and divinity; beings participate 
in being itself and are thus maintained out of non-being.
None of these types are ever, in practice, perfectly realised. The 
first two are always ambiguous because man suffers from existential 
estrangement; while the third, though not ambiguous, is fragmentary 
because the manifestations of the divine within existence are always 
fragmentary.
It can be seen that the second usage of participation, namely that 
between the realms of existence and essense, is not divisible any 
further; but is simply the straightforward statement of Tillich's
rather Platonic assertion that every existent being
"participates in the essences which make it what it is under
the conditions of existence." (1)
The remaining two uses of participation, however, are both analysable 
into a number of different meanings. Consider first the concept of
(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I pl96
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participation within the realm of existence; this is used in the 
following ways.
(i) Participation in the sense of polar opposition to 
individualisation. This along with the idea that God participates in 
being as its ground is perhaps Tillich’s most important usage of the 
term. The polarity of individualisation and participation is one of 
the three pairs of elements constituting the basic ontological 
structure of reality and is, therefore, fundamental to the system.
"Participation is essential for the individual, not 
accidental. No individual exists without participation, and 
no personal being exists without communal being" (1)
Tillich describes man, under the conditions of existential 
estrangement, as oscillating between the two poles, aware that he 
would cease to if either of them were lost.
"Man as finite ... Anxiously experiences the trend from 
possible loneliness to collectivity and from possible 
collectivity to loneliness. He oscillates anxiously between 
individualisation and participation, aware of the fact that 
he ceases to be if any one of the poles is lost, for the 
loss of either pole means the loss of both". (2)
(ii) Participation, in the biological realm, breaking down the 
boundaries of 'beside-each-other-ness ’, and 'after-each-other-ness*. 
In reality these do not have an exclusive character but all elements 
are linked both spatially and temporally through the concept of 
participation.
(1) ibid. pl95
(2) ibid. p221
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"The space of a tree is not the space of an aggregate of
unconnected inorganic parts but the space of a unity of
interdependant elements ... The distance between roots and
leaves does not have the quality of exclusiveness. In the
same way the exclusive after-each-other-ness of temporality 
is broken by the participation of the stages of growth
within each-other." (1)
The present is seen as including the anticipated future and the 
remembered past through participation.
"As the space of all parts of a tree is the whole tree, so
the time of all moments of a process of growth is the whole
process" (2)
(iii) Love as participation; Love is described as:
"...the whole being's movement towards another being to
overcome existential separation" (3)
This is the point of identity between the various forms of love, 
philia, libido, eros and agape all contain this ’urge toward the 
reunion of the separated' which Tillich calls the "inner dynamics of 
life" (4). The difference between agape and eros (used as a general 
term to describe the other kinds of love) is that agape is a creation 
of the Spiritual presence.
"Agape is unambiguous love and therefore impossible for the 
human spirit by itself. As faith, it is an ecstatic
(1) S.T. Ill p337
(2) ibid. p337
(3) ibid. pl45
(4) ibid. pl46
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participation of the finite spirit in the transcendent unity 
of unambiguous life", (1)
For Tillich, however, agape is primarily the love God has for the 
creature and through the creature for himself rather than the love of 
man for God. This latter is described as the drive toward the reunion 
of the separated, but it goes beyond any specific form of love. The 
love of man for God is best characterised as the union of faith with 
love.
"Being grasped by God in faith and adhering to him in love 
is one and the same state of creaturely life". (2)
If we turn from agape to eros we find something of a contradiction in
Tillich's assertions. He insists that love must include knowledge of 
the beloved, where knowledge is seen as;
"...the participating knowledge which changes both the 
knower and the known in the very act of loving knowledge". (3) 
However, he also believes that emotional participation suffers from 
the same oscillation and ambiguity as was found in the polarity of 
individualisation and participation; and that, while in theory, there 
may be no limits to the participation of a completely centred self, 
this is not so in practice.
"In the state of estrangement man is shut within himself and 
cut off from participation". (4)
This means that one is unable to participate in the centre of anothers
being and that the ’drive toward reunion’ is bound to fail.
(1) ibid. pl43
(2) ibid. pl47
(3) ibid. pl45
(4) S.T. II p75
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"In reality, emotional participation in the other one is 
emotional oscillation within one’s self created by an 
assumed participation in the other one". (1)
Tillich may well argue that, for him, love is more than mere emotional 
participation but this is no real defence for he has also admitted 
that;
"love without its emotional quality is 'good will’ towards 
somebody or something, but it is not love". (2)
There is either a contradiction involved here or Tillich is denying 
the possibility of any kind of love other than agape under the 
conditions of estrangement. If it is the former that is correct than 
clarification is required, if the latter then I believe Tillich to be 
mistaken.
(iv) Participation in terms of knowledge and understanding. It is 
impossible to know or understand something we do not participate in. 
Tillich asserts that everything approachable by knowledge must have 
the structure of ’being knowable' and that this structure includes a 
mutual participation of knower and known.
"Man participates in the universe through the rational 
structure of mind and reality... Considered cosmically, he 
participates in the universe because the universal 
structures, forms, and laws are open to him". (3)
Through these universels man too becomes potentially universal. Man 
is microcosmos, the world is present in him directly and in conscious 
encounter.
(1) S.T. Ill p82
(2) ibid. pl45
(3) S.T. I pl95
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"Through the universals man participates in the remotest 
stars and the remotest past". (1)
I understand this as meaning not that man knows the remotest stars and 
the remotest past but rather that there is nothing intrinsically 
unknowable about these things. Man has the potential to know anything 
which shares in the universal structures, forms, and laws but in 
practice is limited by existence.
In terms of understanding Tillich asserts that we can only understand 
anything to the extent that we have experienced it.
"Understanding demands one's participation in what one 
understands, and we can participate only in terms of what we 
are, including our own categories of understanding". (2)
To use one of Tillich's own examples; the only authentic way to 
understand another religion is through actual experience.
"The Christian theologian can understand Eastern mysticism 
only to the degree in which he has experience the mystical 
element in Christianity". (3)
We have no way of understanding what we have not participated in or 
experienced, although we may be able to appreciate something on an 
intellectual level. For instance, one cannot understand fear unless 
one has experienced it although it should be possible to apply an 
intellectual concept of fear to the actions or reports of others.
(1) ibid. pl95
(2) S.T. II pl20
(3) S.T. Ill pl51. This, of course, assumes the
phenomenological description of religions, typified by N. 
Smart, as being analysable into a number of common elements.
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(v) Participation as a part of the ontological element of relation. 
"Every relation includes a kind of participation. This is 
true even of indifference or hostility. Nothing can make 
one hostile in which one does not somehow participate, 
perhaps in the form of being excluded from it". (1)
(vi) Participation as a moral imperative.
"The moral imperative demands that one self participate in 
the centre of the other self and consequently accept his 
particularities even if there is no convergence of 
individuals as individuals". (2)
Tillich sees this as being the basis of love in the sense of agape 
when we use this term to apply to the fragmentary but essential love 
of man for his fellow men.
(vii) Participation as representation in the concept of symbolism. A 
symbol -
"represents the power and meaning of what is symbolised 
through participation. The symbol participated in the 
reality which is symbolised". (3)
Participation is used by Tillich, in this case, to distinguish signs 
from symbols. The concept of prehension cannot be used to clarify 
what Tillich means here, but the importance of this concept and 
various criticisms of it have been fully elucidated in chapter one.
When Tillich uses the concept of participation to apply to the divine-
(1) S.T. I pl96
(2) S.T. Ill p48
(3) S.T. II plO
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human relation he does so in four distinguishable ways,
(a) The participation of God as the ground of every life.
"God is the principle of participation... The divine life 
participates in every life as its ground and aim. God 
participates in everything that is; he has community with 
it; he shares in its destiny... The divine participation 
creates that in which it participates". (1)
This is not to say that there is something alongside God in which he 
participates. These statements are symbolic and must not be taken as 
implying that God’s participation is in any way a spatial or temporal 
presence.
"It is meant not categorically but symbolically. It is the
parousia, the ’being with' of that which is neither here nor
there". (2)
It is principally a symbol for God's omnipresence, for, "his creative 
participation in the spatial existence of his creatures', (3) which 
he is not subject to but transcends.
(b) The participation of God in the suffering of man and in the
conditions of existential estrangement. This seems a rather curious 
idea for Tillich to hold but he finds it necessary to answer the
question of theodicy.
"God as creative life includes the finite and, with it, non- 
being, although non-being is eternally conquered and the finite 
is eternally reunited within the infinity of the divine life.
(1) S.T. I p272
(2) ibid. p272
(3) ibid. p308
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Therefore, it is meaningful to speak of a participation of 
the divine life in the negativities of creaturely life". (1)
Thus if God participates in the destiny of creaturely existence, as 
its creative ground, then the collective destiny must be one of
fulfilment. This helps with the question of theodicy because Tillich 
insists that the destiny of an individual cannot be separated from the 
destiny of the whole in which it participates. Therefore, ultimately 
all individuals must be fulfilled and the fact that this is not
apparent is due to our lack of understanding. It is not within the 
scope of this present study to discuss the merits or otherwise of this 
kind of theodicy, suffice to say that for Whitehead this problem does 
not arise. In terms of clarification by prehension this use of the
term participation is no different to the more general usage of God
participating in everything that is.
(c) The participation of man in eternal life.
"Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative 
synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has 
made of it in its temporal existence". (2)
Tillich uses this meaning of participation when describing how, in the
ever present end of history, the positive content of life is elevated
into eternity while the negatives are excluded. Whatever happens in
creation contributes in every moment to the eternal life.
"What happens in time and space, in the smallest particle of 
matter as well as in the greatest personality is significant
(1) ibid. p300
(2) S.T. Ill p427
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for eternal life".(l)
But eternal life is direct participation in the divine life so that 
everything in creation is seen as participating in God in so far as it 
has been positive.
"In so far as the negative has maintained possession of it, 
it is... excluded from eternal memory. Whereas, in so far as 
the essential has conquered existential distortion its 
standing is higher in eternal life". (2)
(d) The participation of man in the New Being. Tillich uses the word
'experience' to describe this kind of participation. It is the
experience or awareness of being grasped by the spiritual presence 
which gives the reason or spiritual foundation for our statements of 
faith. Tillich explains Paul's formula 'being in Christ' by reference 
to participation; Paul did not mean a psychological empathy but an
ecstatic participation, through which one lives in the sphere of
Christ's spiritual power. This participation in the Christ takes 
place in the realm of his own participation in God. It is the
universality of Christ's relation to God that makes it possible for
everyone to participate in it.
"In terms of personal participation in his being, we do not 
know anyone better because his being is the New Being which 
is universally valid for every human being". (3)
It is this participation of Christ in God and at the same time in the
negativities of estrangement which guarantees salvation. Salvation
(1) ibid. p424
(2) ibid. p427
(3) S.T. II pl34
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and rebirth depend upon participation in the saving power of the New 
Being and in the new eon which Christ brought.
"... participation in the divine participation, accepting it 
and being transformed by it - that is the threefold 
character of the state of salvation”. (1)
Participation in the New Being also serves another function however,
that of validating the reality of the historical existence of Jesus 
the Christ, although it cannot guarantee his name to be Jesus of 
Nazareth!
"... participation, not historical argument, guarantees the 
reality of the event upon which Christianity is based. It 
guarantees a personal life in which the New Being has 
conquered the old being". (2)
This saving and, at the same time, guaranteeing participation in the 
New Being cannot be clarified in any way by prehension. Whitehead was 
not interested in the classical Christian doctrines of Christology and
Atonement. Participation is better seen here as a 'sharing in',
rather than a 'prehension of. New Being.
(1) ibid. p203
(2) S.T. II pl31
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Ill Participation clarified by prehension
I believe that the concept of prehension can be used to clarify what 
Tillich means by participation in some of the uses analysed above. 
Most notably in the case of Tillich's two most important uses of the 
term: participation as a polar element with individualisation, and the 
participation of God as the ground of being. I shall use the above 
analysis and comment on each type of participation in turn.
1 (1) For Tillich a being participates in proportion to its level of
individualisation, the more individualised a being is the more it can
participate. The ultimate example of this, other than God who
completely transcends such polarities anyway, is man.
"When individualisation reaches the perfect form which we 
call a 'person', participation reaches the perfect form 
which we call communion". (1)
Tillich does not explain, however, how these two poles can be
maintained and related in man; he does not satisfactorily explain what 
it means for a completely self centred being to participate and it is 
here that process can render assistance. In process, the basic unit 
of reality is the actual occasion, and an individual being (such as a 
person) is nothing more, or less, than a closely related series of 
such occasions linked together by prehension. This makes absolute 
identity and absolute non-identity of creatures impossible because, 
concretely, any individual is a new reality each fraction of a second. 
"Each time I say 'I' the word refers to a new concrete 
reality. From a more or less abstract point of view the 
same reality...is denoted: but is not all actual value in
(1) S.T. I pl95
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the concrete - the momentary states, rather than the ever 
identical person?...In some ways I am not myself two seconds 
running, and in some ways I am my neighbour. My 
recollections and his often largely overlap, our purposes, 
hopes and fears likewise: and as Royce so eloquently argued, 
what is the self apart from its fund of recollections, and 
its hopes, aim and fear for the future." (1)
We can see then that any individual being must have individualisation, 
in the sense of relative identity, or else its series would end. Each 
element in the series must have sufficient in common with its 
immediate predecessors to be able to prehend them. At the same time a 
being must participate because bonds of sympathy and empathy are not 
restricted to a personal series. I can feel sympathy with a past 
occasion in the personal series of some other individual in exactly 
the same way as I can feel sympathy with a past occasion in my own 
personal series. These sympathies are literally identical in nature 
not merely analogical or symbolic.
To view participation in this way also gives clarity to Tillich's 
assertion that we cannot separate the destiny of an individual from 
the destiny of the whole in which he participates. Prehension helps 
us to see how, in a sense, individuals are part of the whole. The 
whole, the totality of all occasions, is part of God and individual 
series' within this totality all share in the same destiny; namely to 
be for God, to contribute to God's concrete being. I see no 
satisfactory way in which substance philosophies can make such sense
(1) Hartshorne, C. from Lefevre, P. (ed.) Philosophical Resources 
for Christian Thought. p55
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of Tillich's statements. Similarly I see no problem for this analysis 
in Tillich's idea that man, while participating in all levels of
reality participates fully only in the level of other persons.
Obviously an occasion within a human life prehends many actualities 
but the bonds of empathy must be strongest towards occasions in 
another human life. This is because such an entity will have far more 
in common with an entity in a similar series than it will with a more 
'distant' one, even though the bonds of similarity may be strong
enough for prehension. Perhaps it may be argued that prehension does
not help us to understand why individualisation and participation are 
proportionally related. However, I see Tillich's statements as 
asserting nothing more than that greater individualisation is 
identical with biological advancement. For Tillich, levels of 
individualisation are linked to biological hierachy and the more
individualised beings are, what Whitehead would call 'high grade
organisms'. Process would say that throughout the creaturely realm 
there it is a range of creative freedom rather than a progression of 
individualisation. Each occasion is given a range of possibilities 
for actualisation which are relevant to it. An occasion within a 
human beings personal series will, therefore, have a greater range of 
possibilities, a greater amount of creativity, than will an occasion 
within the personal series of a stone. Hence we can say that, for 
Tillich, the higher the grade of an organism the more individualised
it is and thus the more it is able to participate; while for process
the higher the grade of an organism then the more it can prehend of, 
contribute to, or participate in its environment.
The benefits of the dialogue between participation and prehension at 
this point are not totally one way. While the polarity of 
individualisation and participation may be explained along the lines
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of Hartshorne's relative identity and relative non-identity process 
philosophy can also be enriched by Tillich’s astute phenomenological 
description of the constant tension between the desire for solitude 
and the desire for communion. This is a combination of strengths. 
Tillich is at his best when describing man’s existential situation, 
and process is one of the most rigidly defined and articulated 
metaphysics.
1 (ii) When Tillich speaks of participation overcoming the exclusive 
character of beside-each-other-ness and after-each-other- ness he does 
so in both the biological and psychological realm. In the latter case 
he can speak of experienced time, that is the time of a living being, 
as participating in both the past and the future.
"...the experienced present... includes the remembered past 
and the anticipated future in terms of participation. 
Participation is not identity, and the element of after- 
each-other-ness is not removed; but its exclusiveness is 
broken, both in reality and in awareness." (1)
In a similar fashion Tillich claims that the apparent beside-each- 
other-ness of cause and effect, in the organic realm,is also broken 
down by participation.
"Within an organism the conditioning precedent is a state of 
the organism and the conditioned subsequent is another state 
of the same organism. There may be causal influences on an 
organic system from outside, but they are not cause of the 
consequent state of the organism; they are an occasion for
(1) S.T. Ill p337
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the organic processes which lead from the one to the other 
state."(1)
The relative identity and relative non-identity of process can also 
explain this element of participation. If we use Tillich's example of 
the parts of a tree we see that, for process, such things as leaves, 
branches and roots are all ordered series’ of actual occasions. In 
reaching its concrecence an entity will prehend not only past members 
of its own series but also past members of other relevant series’. 
Thus the element of beside-each-other-ness, while not destroyed, is 
made non-exclusive. Likewise with Tillich’s example of cause and 
effect. It is not the external factors which create a particular 
state of an organism. An entity within an organisms series prehends 
the past members of its own series plus external entities and creates 
itself; the cause and effect participate in each other through 
prehension, within the process of becoming. Similarly, with regard to 
the after-each-other-ness of temporality, Tillich claims that the 
experienced present includes the remembered past and the anticipated 
future. In process the past is included within the present as 
prehended data, as "immortal actuality", while the "future is involved 
in the present as 'potentiality’"(2). In other words there could be 
no present without a past, because each new present occasion requires 
the prehension of past actuality in order to create itself. 
Furthermore, to be is to become data for future potential actualities, 
therefore, given the present the future is necessary, not as 
specifically determinate but as a future of some kind. Thus the 
element of after-each-other-ness is maintained because actual
(1) ibid. p343
(2) Hartshorne, C. Whitehead’s Philosophy. pl27
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occasions follow each other temporally, but its exclusive character is 
broken:
"First, because the occurrence of events strictly entails 
that of those events which they prehend; secondly, because 
process is bound to go on, and subsequent events must have 
enough in common with their predecessors to be suitable 
prehendors for these",(1)
Prehension here can not take account of one element in Tillich's use 
of participation, namely, the distinct difference between the organic 
and the inorganic. For Tillich, inorganic matter is subject to the 
radical beside-each-other-ness of space; whereas for process there is 
only a difference of degree rather than a difference of type between 
the organic and inorganic. I do not believe this invalidates the use 
of prehension to describe what Tillich means by participation as I do 
not think the distinction between organic and inorganic is of
fundamental importance for Tillich.
JL (iii) In the analysis of Tillich's concept of love we discovered 
something of a contradiction. Tillich speaks of love as being 
participation in another personal centre and yet denies the
possibility of such participation under the conditions of existence.
If Tillich is denying the validity of any love which does not have the
participation of the spiritual presence then, I believe, he is 
mistaken. This position goes against common sense, which experiences 
feelings and acts of love in our daily lives, and can only be 
maintained by using the word love in a non-ordinary sense. This 
problem arises in Tillich for two reasons; First, he is concerned to 
maintain a distinction between man's existential life and his
(1) ibid. pl26
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essential being, and uses participation, among other concepts, to 
achieve this. Unfortunately you cannot assert a qualitative 
difference between existential and essential love without denying the 
reality or value of the former. If Tillich wanted to maintain this 
distinction within the concept of love he would have done better to 
suggest a quantitative difference. Thus, under the conditions of 
existence, an individual can love, in the sense of participate in the 
personal centre of, a very few other individuals; whereas essentially 
an individual is capable of loving all other individuals which it 
encounters. This maintains Tillich's distinction between essence and 
existence while at the same time allowing him to assert the 
phenomenological reality of love. It also does not contradict the 
reality of agape ; used in the sense of love under the participation of 
the spiritual presence. Process philosophy cannot help us here 
because it does not contain any kind of essence/existence distinction; 
although Hartshorne would agree that love can be both perfect and 
imperfect. Only God can love perfectly; man loves in an imperfect or 
incomplete fashion having drawn his concept of love from an intuition 
of the divine nature.
The second reason for Tillich's contradiction is that he is using 
substance philosophy to explain aspects of reality which it cannot 
cope with. He is fettered by the limitations of a philosophy which he 
is attempting to break away from - while remaining loyal to. 
Substance philosophy is at a loss to explain how love can be spoken of 
in terms of participation in another self. In such philosophies I can 
love myself because I just am myself, but if I love another it is 
across a metaphysical gulf because I am not that other. Process, 
however, can make such descriptions perfectly understandable. There 
are strong similarities between feelings of love directed to either
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past or potentially future occasions in my own personal series and 
such feelings directed towards similar occasions in another personal
series. The metaphysical gulf between beings is bridged and the
concept of relative non-identity can make sense of such feelings as 
sympathy, love, dislike and hate.
There is an unsatisfactory element in attempting to replace 
participation with prehension, in this case, because the act of 
prehending does not decide whether an entity will become an object of 
love, hate, indifference or whatever for the concrescing occasion. 
However, I think, part of the reason for this frustration lies in 
Tillich's apparent identification of love with participation. If love 
is to participate then what is hate? If hate is exclusion from 
participation then what is indifference? And between these extremes 
what of like and dislike and other subtler shades of feeling? Surely
hate requires participation just as much as love and, infact, Tillich
admits this. While indifference, like or dislike may be described as 
participation in the periphery there still needs to be a mechanism, 
other than participation, to distinguish between them. Hate cannot be 
brushed aside as participation in the periphery of another individual, 
it requires something stronger and if we are going to speak of hate 
and love as requiring the same type of participation then we need a 
mechanism to distinguish them. An entity or series of entities must 
be prehended before it can be loved or hated and in the same way an 
individual must participate in the personal centre of another before 
love or hate are possible. This is perhaps somewhat unfair to Tillich 
who does speak of love as the "dynamic power of life" (1), but his
(1) S.T. II p82
136
over use of the term participation is bound to lead to such problems. 
He does have, within his concept of love, a usage of participation 
which can be viewed as a special case of participation within the 
concept of relation and this is explainable by prehension. Tillich’s
phenomenological description of the problems of emotional
participation goes beyond this usage of the term, however, and is well 
worth preserving. Tillich describes attempted emotional participation 
in another individual as involving;
"...chaotic self surrender which, in an act of throwing
one's self shamelessly, brings everything to the other one;
but he who receives it cannot use it, because it has lost
its secrecy and uniqueness"(1)
1 (iv) When Tillich asserts that we can only know or understand
something to the extent that we participate in it I can see no useful
purpose in this other than can be explained by reference to
prehension. For example I know Ben Nevis to be a mountain in the 
Scottish highlands but how do I participate in this fact other than in 
terms of prehension? Process would say that I know Ben Nevis' to be a 
Scottish mountain because at some time in the past an actual occasion 
in my personally ordered series prehended and objectified a past 
entity, or group of entities, which contained this information.
Knowledge is a function potential to all actualities during their 
concrescence, although this potential may not always be realised.
Tillich wishes to maintain a structure of 'being knowable' for all
facts which are open to our knowledge. He sees this as combatting
Nominalism which, for him, cannot make sense of the process of
(1) S.T. Ill p82
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knowledge. This is perfectly compatible with a description of
participation as prehension. Every occasion must be prehended by some 
future occasions and, therefore, there must be sufficient similarities 
between prehended and prehender to make this possible. In Tillichian 
language the known must have the structure of being knowable and the 
knower must participate in this structure or, conversely, in order to 
know something the knower must have sufficient in common with it. In 
terms of understanding, however, prehension may not seem as 
applicable. Understanding is of a higher order than straight forward 
knowledge. It is obviously true that we cannot understand what we do 
not prehend but this is flippant, surely understanding requires more 
of participation than can be explained by prehension? I do not think 
so; if an entity has creative freedom in its concrescence than it can 
choose how to objectify its prehensions. It is the entity's own
decision as to how much value is actualised. If understanding is 
actualised then knowledge is included and greater value ensues. 
Similarly, the actualisation of empathy, which goes beyond both
understanding and knowledge, would include the other two categories 
and actualise still further value. Participation in terms of 
knowledge and understanding then is eminently understandable on a 
model of prehension.
1 (v) The meaning of participation as required by the ontological 
element of relation was touched upon in the discussion of love. This 
is a very poor usage of the term participation, because it says 
nothing more than the obvious tautology that one cannot have a 
relationship with what one is not somehow related to. To use the word 
participate to include exclusion, as Tillich does, is to confuse our 
ordinary usage of the term beyond recognition.
"Nothing can make one hostile in which one does not
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participate, perhaps in the form of being excluded from it". (1) 
This says nothing other than the fact that hostility is somehow linked 
to participation or lack of it, perhaps we could state the obvious a 
little better by saying that one can only be related to something 
through prehension. To quote Whitehead:
"An actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with each 
item in the universe. This determinate bond is its 
prehension of that item, A negative prehension is the 
definite exclusion of that item from positive contribution 
to the subject’s own real internal constitution... A 
positive prehension is the definite inclusion of that item 
into positive contribution to the subjects own real internal 
constitution". (2)
This allows us to point out that in an absolute sense all things are 
related to one another. However, it is only when an entity is 
positively prehended that the relationship becomes important or 
constitutive. It is, therefore, I believe, better both
philosophically and for Christian theology (where ultimately all 
things must be related to God) to speak of the ontological element of 
relation requiring prehension rather than the Tillichian 
participation.
1 (vi) In the case of participation as a moral imperative there is 
little prehension can do, it is hardly a moral imperative to prehend - 
merely a fact of existence. It is, however, interesting to compare
(1) S.T. I pl96
(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p56
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the moral imperatives of Tillich and process. For Tillich the
imperative is to participate in, and accept the particularities of,
other individuals even if these particularities do not coincide with 
your own. In other words we must accept people for what they are and 
love them in the sense of agape. This seems rather a case of 
preserving the status quo and is somewhat unsatisfactory when compared 
to process. For Hartshorne the moral imperative does not merely 
require acceptance but seeks to improve.
"... be creative and foster creativity in others... Be
everywhere and always seeking ways to bring new values to
life, that is the true imitatio dei". (1)
Merely obeying negative rules or even accepting things or people as 
they are is insufficient, one should try to maximise value at every 
moment of life. Ultimately the enjoyment of such value is experienced 
by God alone, man's reward being simply the service of God.
"The essential reward of virtue ... is intrinsic and
present, not extrinsic or future". (2)
This is surely the highest moral imperative and does require, in every 
sense of the word, participation in the personal centre of other 
selves.
Prehension can be of no help in clarifying Tillich's use of 
participation in his concept of symbolism. However there are obvious 
parallels between Tillich's discussion of existent beings
(1) Hartshorne, C. from Lefevre, P. (ed.) Philosophical Resources 
for Christian Thought. p60
(2) ibid. p52
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participating in their essences and Whitehead's talk of eternal
objects as data for prehension. For Tillich a tree is a tree because
it participates in the essence of 'treehood', while for Whitehead it
prehends the eternal object of 'treehood'. Both men are equally
Platonic here. Tillich's essences and Whitehead's eternal objects are 
Plato's forms. Obviously Hartshorne would disagree with all three; 
but prehension is not a Hartshornian concept and he can only utilise 
it by subsuming mental into physical prehension.
It is when Tillich speaks of participation between existence and 
divinity that we see the closest correlation between participation and 
prehension. For Tillich, "the divine life participates in every life 
as its ground and aim" (1) but, we are told, this only happens 
symbolically, whatever that may mean. Process provides the mechanism 
by which God can participate in creation. In process God provides an 
aim for each occasion as well as providing, as the principle of 
limitation or concretion, the framework of order without which there 
could be no occasions. Moreover God is, in a very real sense, the aim 
of each occasion because, to echo Hartshorne's sentiment 'to be is to 
be for God'. Tillich adds that God has community with his creatures, 
by community he means perfect participation. Surely this implies no 
more than the process statement that God perfectly prehends and 
preserves all completed actuality. Tillich also claims that God 
shares in the destiny of each creature. What stronger sharing of 
destiny between God and creation is there than that provided by 
process terminology. God is, we have seen, the aim or destiny of each 
entity; every occasion will be prehended by, and immortally 
objectified, in God; and, at the same time, God's destiny is created
(1) S.T. I p272
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by the world. God must use the data he prehends from the world to 
create himself anew at each moment, so, in a literal sense, the 
destiny of God and the world are indivisible.
This correlation appears to be reinforced when we examine Tillich's 
thinking on the participation of man in eternal life. His statements 
on this, quoted earlier, are extremly panentheistic and reminiscent of 
process. In fact, one could with ease replace participation with
prehension in this case apart from two factors, one minor and one 
insurmountable. The minor factor is that Tillich speaks of negativity 
being excluded from the divine memory whereas, for process, there is 
no negativity as such. For process the only negativity is relative 
and relates to lack of fulfilled potential; an entity cannot create 
negativity but can fail to actualise high orders of value. The
insurmountable factor is the difference between objective and
subjective immortality. For participation to be translated into
prehension in this usage we must posit an objective immortality; God 
cannot prehend and maintain an occasion’s subjectivity. But this will 
not do for Tillich who sees immortality as being the subjective 
immortality of the spirit - symbolically of course!
This illustrates the ultimate impossibility of clarifying such a 
meaning of participation by prehension. Tillich insists that any talk 
of God participating must be symbolic and, as I argued earlier, if we 
remove symbolism Tillich must either move towards process or classical 
theism. The concept of prehension and Tillich's concept of
participation in this usage are virtually interchangeable if one uses 
participation literally. However, this is making Tillich a process, 
di-polar theist, which he does not want to be. The problem remains
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one of being unable Co clarify any of Tillich's assertions about God 
without removing his all pervasive symbolism, but if we do this we do 
not clarify Tillich but create another theological position.
In conclusion, I believe that we can see in Tillich's concept of 
participation both a difference in type and a difference in level. 
The different types of meaning are analysed, in detail, above but 
within these we find varying levels of participation. Tillich uses 
the one term to cover everything from a basic 'having of relation', 
which is inherent in all uses of participation, to the creating and 
sustaining power of God. I believe that much of the confusion and 
dislike over Tillich's concept of participation arises from such wide 
ranging usage. I further believe that the concept can be greatly 
clarified by using prehension to illuminate the lower orders thereby 
freeing participation from its cloying generality.
I have argued above how prehension can be used to interpret the use of 
participation in the areas of; polar opposition to individualisation, 
overcoming after-each-other-ness and beside-each-other-ness, 
knowledge, and the ontological element of relation. All of these are 
essentially basic relational uses of participation and do not require 
anymore than a coherent concept of relatedness such as prehension. 
Participation can thus be reserved for higher order meanings. By 
higher order meanings I am referring to, for example, the saving 
participation of man in the New Being, the participation of love in 
the sense of agape, and perhaps a more dynamic moral imperative freed 
from participation as simple relatedness. Of course the question of 
analysing exactly what is meant by participation in these cases is 
still necessary but a start can be made by clearing away the dead wood
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of lesser meanings. By cleansing participation of elements of simple 
relatedness we can see more clearly what is left to analyse and 
understand.
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CONCLUSION
There are several conclusions to be drawn from this work. First, the
idea of a process concept of God is, in one respect, something of a
misnomer in that Hartshorne and Whitehead have quite distinct
differences brought about largely by Hartshorne’s rejection of all
Platonic forms. This causes the two men to use the concept of
dipolarity differently. It enables Hartshorne to distinguish between
God and the world, while for Whitehead it provides God with a
consequent or immanent aspect. The similarities are so obvious, 
however, that, providing we keep this difference in mind, we can speak 
of a process concept of God.
Second, I believe that, because of this difference, the concept of God 
as expounded by Whitehead is closer to Tillich’s then is Hartshorne’s
and, therefore, is more open to comparison.
Third, and most important, I believe that the attempts to unite
Tillich and process are doomed to fail because of insurmountable 
differences between the two. Ultimately Tillich’s insistence on
symbolism separates him from process dipolarity, and only by
distorting Tillich beyond all recognition can this be overcome.
Having said this I also believe that in certain areas the two systems 
have a lot to offer each other. I conclude that Tillich's strength 
lies in his phenomenological insights into the human situation, while 
process' lies in its coherence and definition. I believe these
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relative strengths can be utilised and that some of Tillich's insights 
can be clarified using process terminology while at the same time 
giving more richness and depth back to process. Examples of this are 
Tillich's definition of faith as ultimate concern, his description of 
the ontological shock, and his concept of participation.
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